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Abstract
Gender, Competition, & Confidence with Methodological Insights: Experimental
Evidence
by
Brianna Noelle Halladay
This dissertation is a collection of two laboratory experiments addressing lead-
ing empirical questions in behavioral responses to competition including observed
gender differences and one survey paper addressing methodological concerns facing
experimental economists.
In the first paper, I use a laboratory experiment to investigate the role of the gen-
der perception of the task in tournament selection decisions. I find that while women
enter the tournament at significantly lower rates than men under the male stereotype
task, more women than men enter the tournament under the female stereotype task.
It appears that greater female confidence and lower male confidence in the female
stereotype task drives this observed difference in entry rates across tasks.
In another laboratory experiment, I investigate whether past history with an indi-
vidual, specifically negative history affects behavioral responses in a tournament with
the individual. Using a laboratory experiment, I find that while women respond to
the negative history with increased performance in the tournament, male performance
in unaffected regardless of emotional stimuli.
In the third paper, I further the discussion of payment schemes for laboratory ex-
periments including the necessity of providing subjects with choices that are incentive
compatible.
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Chapter 1
Perception Matters: The Role of
Task Gender Stereotype on
Confidence and Tournament
Selection
1.1 Introduction
A gender gap in competitiveness is well documented in the literature. There are
two possible channels that may be responsible for the observed gap. It is possible
that this gender gap is driven mainly by women’s distaste for competition. However,
it is also possible that this gender gap is driven mainly by a difference in beliefs about
future performance across genders. In their seminal paper, Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007)[1] note, “However to the extent that there are gender differences in the par-
ticipants’ beliefs about their future performance and that these influence tournament
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entry, our study incorrectly attributes such an effect to men and women having dif-
ferent preferences for performing in a competition.” Currently, there is little research
analyzing which channel is responsible for the gender gap in competitiveness. This
study will serve as a first step in distinguishing between these two possible channels.
I use a controlled laboratory setting to analyze tournament selection using a task
that carries a female gender stereotype. While much of the previous research has em-
ployed tasks carrying either a male gender stereotype or a “neutral” gender stereotype,
my study adds to the body of research by using a task that previous research suggests
carries a female stereotype.
This experiment exploits the gender stereotype of two tasks: an arithmetic task
gender stereotyped in favor of men and a facial emotion recognition task gender
stereotyped in favor of women. While both men and women have the capacity to
excel at math, society traditionally views math as a male domain. Lundeberg et
al. (1994)[2] find evidence that in certain settings, specifically math, men were more
confident than women. Nosek et al. (2002)[3] echo this finding in their series of
studies. In particular, the authors consistently find that women have more negative
views of math than men both implicitly and explicitly.
Neurological research substantiates the belief that women are more intuitive and
emotional beings than men. In tasks where men and women assess the approach-
ability of an individuals face, interestingly, men take significantly longer to make
judgments despite no significant difference in accuracy found (Hall et al., 2012)[4].
Also, using fMRI data, Hall et al. (2012)[4] find that men show significantly more
brain activity than women when making the facial judgments. As a control, brain
activity was consistent across both genders when making determinations of sex based
on a photograph, suggesting that social decisions are more taxing and complex for
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men. In an online study for the Edinburgh International Science Festival involving
more than 15,000 people, 77% of women judged themselves are highly intuitive while
only 58% of men judged themselves are highly intuitive[5]. Additionally, women are
better at expressing their emotions and are therefore viewed as more empathic than
men. A researcher from the Greater Good Science Center, Emiliana Simon-Thomas
(2007)[6], notes, “We all know the stereotype: Women are better than men at tak-
ing other people’s perspectives, feeling their pain, and experiencing compassion for
them.” In a study conducted in Germany, 63% of Germans believed women had better
intuition about selecting a romantic partner. A majority of subjects also believed that
women’s intuition was overall better in regards to decisions about one’s personal life.
Gigerenzer et al. (2013)[7] conclude that this confirms the validity of the common
gender stereotype that women are between at inferring people’s intentions.
While there are many factors that may influence an individual’s decision to enter
a competition in the field, the control of the laboratory allows me to isolate differences
in behavior across task gender stereotype, absent concerns about discrimination for
example. I test whether men enter a tournament more often than women when the
task carries a female stereotype as opposed to a male stereotype.
For the purpose of this study, I replicated the study by Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007)[1] and added an additional treatment. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1] use a
math task in their study, which can be thought of as carrying a male stereotype. For
the additional treatment, I follow the experimental design of Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007)[1], but use a task that carries a female stereotype. My experiment uses a
between-subjects design such that no subject participates in more than one treatment.
Subjects participate in groups of four, two men and two women. In both treatments,
subjects complete the task under a piece-rate compensation scheme and then under
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a tournament compensation scheme. Next, subjects can select which compensation
scheme they prefer to determine compensation in the third round. In the final round,
subjects choose whether they want their piece-rate performance paid according to
a piece-rate compensation scheme or a tournament compensation scheme. While
subjects are aware of their own absolute performance, at no point until the end
of the experiment do subjects learn about their relative performance. Subjects are
randomly paid for one of the four rounds. Additionally, subjects report beliefs about
relative performance, participate in a Gneezy and Potters (1997)[8] risk assessment,
and complete the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005)[9].
By comparing tournament entry rates across gender and across tasks, I determine
if the task affects the tournament entry decision. Specifically, I analyze how female
tournament selection responds to a task carrying a female stereotype compared to a
task carrying a male stereotype. Higher tournament entry rates for men than women
in both tasks is evidence for the distaste for competition channel, while observing
more tournament entry for women in the female stereotype task than men provides
evidence for the gender difference in beliefs about future performance channel.
The main finding is, controlling for performance, men enter the tournament sig-
nificantly more than women in the male stereotype task, yet more women than men
enter the tournament when the task carries a female stereotype, though this differ-
ence is not statistically significant. Additionally, female (male) confidence in relative
performance appears higher when the task carries a female (male) stereotype and
male (female) confidence in relative performance appears lower when the task car-
ries a female (male) stereotype. Further, my findings in the math task replicate the
findings of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1].
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of previous research
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related to the my research question. Section 3 identifies my experimental design while
section 4 explores my hypotheses and predictions. I present my results in section 5
and discuss the implications of these results in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
In studies where a competitive environment is introduced and subjects do not have
the ability to opt out of the competition, differences in changes in performance across
genders depend on task and opponent gender. Gneezy et al. (2003)[10] use a maze
task to assess responses to competition. They find that while male performance in the
task rises significantly in the presence of competition, female performance remains
static when competing against men. However, in single sex tournaments, women
did respond to competition. Gneezy and Rustichini (2004b)[11] assess responses to
competition among children. The authors observe no difference in running speed
across boys and girls in the noncompetitive environment, but do observe a significant
increase in the running speed of boys after introducing a competition. The running
speed of girls was unaffected by the introduction of the competition. Replicating
and extending the work by Gneezy et al. (2003)[10], Gu¨nther et al. (2010)[12] find
that men respond to competition while women do not in the maze task (which they
denote the male stereotype task), men and women both respond to competition in
the word task (which they denote the neutral stereotype task), and women respond
to competition while men do not in the memory/distraction task (which they denote
the female stereotype task). It is not clear why this is considered a female stereotype
task, nor do the authors have any evidence about gender differences in response to
competition when subjects are given the opportunity to opt out of the tournament.
Replicating and extending Gneezy and Rustichini (2004b)[11], Dreber et al. (2011)[13]
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find that there is no difference in responses to competition across genders for any of the
tasks selected (running, jumping rope, and dancing). I find that in both tasks, men
and women increase performance when the competitive environment is introduced.
Additionally, there is no gender difference in this increase in performance in either
task. Another important question to ask is how subjects respond when given the
opportunity to opt out of a competition.
Gneezy and Rustichini (2004a)[14] use two tasks varying in task gender stereotype.
The authors selected a sports task as the male task and a verbal task as the female
task. Men select into the tournament more often than women in both tasks but the
gender gap is smaller with the female task. Given that subjects observe the gender of
their selected opponent prior to making their compensation scheme decision, Gupta
et al. (2005)[15] find that men choose the competition more often than women. They
suggest that risk aversion primarily drives the choice for women. Despite similar
performances in the task for men and women, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1] find
that men enter the tournament twice as often as women. The authors documented
a preference for competition, but did not distinguish whether it is driven by distaste
for competition or a belief about future performance in the competition. My study
will help to distinguish whether the observed gender gap is arising out of a gender
difference in preference for competition or a gender difference in beliefs about future
performance. Again, despite similar performance, in the arithmetic task, I find that
more men enter the tournament than women while in the facial emotion task, more
women than men enter the tournament.
Recent research has provided evidence about environments that aid in closing the
gender gap in response to competition. [16] Using a maze task, Niederle and Yestrum-
skas (2008)[17] assess gender differences in preferences for performing harder tasks in
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order to potentially increase one’s payoff. Men select the harder task significantly
more often than women despite no differences in performance and beliefs about rel-
ative performance. Given a more flexible choice such that subjects can adjust their
choice between rounds, there is no longer a gender gap in selection of the harder
task. In a study assessing differences in responses to competition across a matrilineal
society and a patrilineal society, Gneezy et al. (2009)[18] find that women choose
the tournament more often than men in the matrilineal society while men choose
the tournament more often than women in the patrilineal society. Team competition
is another environment in which the gender gap in response to competition appears
to eliminate the gender gap in response to competition (Dargnies, 2012[19]; Kuhn
and Villeval, 2014[20]). Evidence provided by Booth and Nolen (2012)[21] suggests
that “nurture” may play a significant role in the commonly observed gender gap in
tournament entry decisions. In a study assessing the tournament entry decisions of
girls from single-sex schools and girls from coed schools, the authors find that girls
from single-sex schools choose the competition at the same rate as boys. Using the
math task from Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1], Niederle et al. (2013)[22] imple-
ment an affirmative action quota in the laboratory and find that women significantly
increase their tournament entry while men significantly decrease their tournament
entry. Cassar et al. (2016)[23] find that creating tournament prizes that benefit one’s
child such as workplace daycare as opposed to monetary prizes erased the gender
gap in tournament selection. Halladay (2016)[24] finds that women will perform in
a competition just as well as men in the presence of negative emotions towards the
opponent.
A few studies have attempted to analyze the effect of a non-male stereotype task
on tournament selection. Grosse et al. (2014)[25] use a neutral stereotype task
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and two male stereotype tasks. The male stereotype tasks include a sports task
where subjects throw tennis balls in a bucket and the math task as in Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007)[1]. The neutral stereotype task involved a list of five words that a
subject needed to place in order to form a grammatically correct sentence. While the
authors observe difference in tournament selection rates across genders in the male
stereotype tasks, there is no observed difference in the neutral task. However, these
results are a bit concerning given the complex nature of the experimental design and
the fact that performance was not similar across genders for the selected tasks. To
avoid this concern, I have chosen two tasks that ex-ante have similar performance
across genders.
In a study perhaps most closely related to my research, Dreber et al. (2014)[26]
utilize both a male stereotype task and a female stereotype task in order to assess
gender differences in self-selection into tournaments. The authors choose a math task
similar to the one used in Neiderle and Vesterlund (2007)[1] for the male stereotype
task and a crossword-like puzzle for the female stereotype task. While math tasks
undoubtedly carry a male dominant perception, gender perception is less clear for
verbal tasks. IT is not clear that verbal tasks carry a female stereotype. A meta-
analysis by Hyde and Linn (1988)[27] of gender differences in verbal tasks finds an
insignificant effect size of +0.11 in favor of females while other studies mentioned
above have used verbal tasks as “neutral”. Additionally, previous studies assessing
gender differences in self-concept in verbal tasks find no gender difference (Hyde et al.,
1990[28]; Meece et al., 1982[29]; Skaalvik and Skaalvik, 2004[30]). Also, by selecting a
math and a verbal task in conjunction with a within-subjects design, there are certain
problematic interactions regarding how individuals perceive their math versus verbal
ability. Because subjects are likely to view math and verbal abilities as dichotomous
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and are completing both tasks, the selection of these two specific task categories can
influence subjects choices and behavior. The authors find that men select into the
tournament more than women in both the math and verbal tasks but the difference
in tournament selection is only significant in the math task. While this result is
interesting, given the concerns above, more research is warranted. My study will help
to clarify the validity of these results absent the concerns mentioned above.
1.3 Experimental Design
The experimental design follows almost exactly that of Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007)[1]. Instructions were adapted from the instructions available on the Lise
Vesterlund’s website and available in the appendix.
The experiment takes place in four main stages, lasting five minutes each followed
by a few simple tasks. The stages differ by the compensation scheme while the
task remains the same across all stages. Participants only learn of the compensation
scheme differences immediately before each stage.
There are two treatments differing by the task. One task is identical to the math
task of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1] while the other task requires subjects to
identify facial emotions in a series of images.
In the math task subjects must add up a series of five randomly selected two-digit
numbers. Subjects have five minutes to correctly answer as many problems as they
can. Subjects cannot use a calculator, but can use the provided scratch paper.
The facial emotion task utilizes professionally classified images obtained from The
Great Good Science Center at the University of California, Berkeley. In each stage
subjects view a series of 15 images, each appearing on the screen for two seconds, and
subjects attempt to correctly select the depicted emotion out of four options. Subjects
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have 20 seconds to submit their answer after each image is displayed. Subjects know
that the same emotions can repeat but the same image will never appear more than
once.
In both tasks, subjects immediately observe whether the answer submitted was
correct or not while also generating a new series of numbers or image depending
on the treatment. Consistent with Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1], in each stage,
subjects continually observe their absolute performance, but subjects never observe
their relative performance until the end of the experiment.
In the first stage, payment follows a piece-rate compensation scheme. For each
correct answer, subjects earn 50 cents.
In the second stage, payment follows a tournament compensation scheme. Pay-
ment depends on the performance of the other three subjects in a participant’s group.
If a participant submits more correct answers than her other three group members,
she receives $2 for each correct answer, and nothing otherwise.
The third stage gives subjects the opportunity to select which compensation
scheme they want applied to their performance in the third stage. If a subject selects
the piece-rate compensation scheme, she receives 50 cents per correct answer in the
third stage. If a subject selects the tournament compensation scheme, her earning
depend on her performance in the third stage relative to the performance of her other
three group members in the second stage tournament. If the subject submits more
correct answers in the third stage than her other three group members did in the
second stage tournament, she receives $2 per correct answer, and nothing otherwise.
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1] note that they designed this stage specifically as
an individual choice, independent of the choices of the other three group members.
They also note that by comparing a subjects Task 3 performance to others’ Task
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2 performance, subjects need only base their choice on their beliefs about relative
performance in a tournament and not beliefs about who will or will not enter the
tournament. Lastly, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1] explain that an observed gen-
der gap in the choices of subjects in Task 3 indicated a gender difference in preference
for performing in competitive environments.
The fourth, and final main stage gives subjects another opportunity to select a
compensation scheme. However, in the fourth stage, subjects do not need to complete
any additional tasks. Task 4 was designed to distinguish between a difference in
preference for competition across genders or perhaps differences in overconfidence,
risk, or feedback aversion across genders. Subjects decide whether they want their
performance from the first stage piece-rate round to be submitted to a tournament
or to remain piece-rate. If a subject selects the piece-rate compensation scheme, she
receives 50 cents per correct answer. If a subject selects the tournament compensation
scheme, her earnings depend on her performance in the first stage relative to the
performance of her other three group members in the first stage. If the subject
submits more correct answers in the first stage than her other three group members
did, she receives $2 per correct answer, and nothing otherwise. Before submitting
their choices, subjects are reminded of their first stage performance.
At the conclusion of the fourth stage, subjects report their beliefs about their
relative performance. First subjects guess their rank in the first stage piece-rate task
and then subjects guess their rank in the second stage tournament. Guesses are
incentivized. Subjects earn $1 for each correct guess.
Additionally, subjects complete a risk elicitation. The risk elicitation follows the
adaptation of the Gneezy and Potters (1997)[8] method utilized by Charness and
Gneezy (2010)[31]. Subjects have 200 tokens ($2) to keep or invest in a risky project.
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Subjects can choose to invest any integer value of their tokens between zero and 200,
inclusive. The risky project has a 50% chance of success. If the project is successful,
a subject receives 2.5 to 1 on the invested amount. If the project fails, whatever is
not invested is kept. We randomly draw a number between one and four. If we draw
a one or a two, the project is successful. If we draw a three or a four, the project is
a failure.
After observing the risk elicitation results, subjects answer three logical questions
based on the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005)[9]. Subjects have five min-
utes to answer all three questions. This experiment uses three questions in the same
spirit of the Cognitive Reflection Test, but not the exact three proposed by Frederick
(2005)[9] because of a concern that a significant portion of the subject pool had been
previously exposed to the Cognitive Reflection Test. The three questions used follow
those of Gillen, Snowberg, and Yariv (2015)[32]. Subjects can earn 50 cents per cor-
rect answer. After the five minutes elapse, subjects are asked how many of the three
questions they believe they answered correctly and also what percent of subjects they
believe answer more questions correctly than they did.
One of the four main stages is randomly selected for payment. In addition to
payment from the randomly selected stage, subjects earn a $5 show-up fee, payment
for correct guesses about relative performance, payment from the results of the risk
elicitation, and payment from the Cognitive Reflection Test.
The experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007)[33]. All sessions
took place in the Experimental and Behavioral Economics Laboratory at the Uni-
versity of California, Santa Barbara. The University’s ORSEE system was used to
recruit subjects. Three or four groups of four participants participated in each ses-
sion. Subjects were seated four per row, each row consisting of two males and two
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females although gender was never explicitly discussed. Groups consisted of the other
participants sitting in the same row as a subject. A total of 154 students participated,
76 subjects (38 males and 38 females) in the math task, and 72 subjects (36 males
and 36 females) in the facial emotion task. No subject participated in more than one
session or more than one treatment. Average earnings were $14.48 and each session
lasted approximately an hour.
1.4 Hypotheses
This experiment addresses three main hypotheses about how women and men
respond to competitive environments.
Both experimental tasks, the arithmetic task and the facial emotion task, involve
very little prior knowledge. There is no general consensus that one gender is better
than another at either task but each task carries a gender stereotype. In their selection
of this specific arithmetic task, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1] note that in a
meta-analysis of over 100 gender studies, there was no observed difference in male
and female performance on computational math tasks. In a study assessing gender
differences in facial emotion recognition, Hoffmann et al. (2010)[34] find that when
the emotional stimuli is highly expressive, men and women perform equally well on
the task. Additionally, Hoffmann et al. (2010)[34] point out evidence from previous
research is mixed, some studies report no gender difference while others suggest a
female advantage. The studies that report a female advantage provide very small
mean effect sizes. Therefore, it seems very reasonable to hypothesize that there will
be no gender difference in performance for either task. Equal performance across
genders is a very important task characteristic for the purpose of this study, allowing
me to rule out gender differences in tournament entry decisions arising from differing
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performance levels. To summarize:
Hypothesis 1: There is no gender difference in performance for
either task.
There appears to be a significant confidence gap between men and women. The
Harvard Business Review mentions a Hewlett-Packard study that found women would
only apply for a promotion when they felt they met 100% of the qualifications while
men would apply when they met at least 60% of the qualifications [35]. However,
because evidence discussed above alludes to the fact that women are more confident
in their ability to harness their “female intuition” as opposed to their math ability, I
hypothesize that women will be more confident in the facial emotion task. Succinctly,
Hypothesis 2: Women are more confident than men in the facial
emotion task, while men are more confident than women in the
arithmetic task.
If women are more confident in their relative ability in the facial emotion task,
it is logical to hypothesize that women will therefore be more willing to enter a
tournament in the facial emotion task as opposed to the math task. Additionally, in
their experiment, Charness et al. (2016)[36] find that differences in confidence across
genders can explain the gender difference in tournament entry rates. Claude Steele
(1997)[37] details how an individual who identifies with a specific domain, in particular
a domain that carries a relevant stereotype, places themselves in a potentially self-
threatening position. As a result, in many instances, individuals will either avoid the
identification all together or disidentify with the relevant domain. In the arithmetic
task, a female who selects the tournament (therefore identifying with math) is thus in
a position to possibly validate the existing stereotype that math is for men if she fails
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to win the tournament. Consequently, females avoid the tournament in the arithmetic
task. Nosek et al. (2002)[3] point out that because math is so heavily aligned with
men, the stronger the association, the more positively men view math, hence one can
expect to view higher tournament entry rates for men in the arithmetic task. With
the facial emotion task, the stereotype threat is absent for women and therefore I
expect to see increased tournament selection. Explicitly:
Hypothesis 3: Women (men) will select into the tournament
more often than men (women) in the facial emotion task (math
task), not controlling for confidence.
1.5 Results
All statistical tests performed in the following analysis are two-tailed unless oth-
erwise specified.
Finding 1: Regardless of task, there is no difference in male and
female performance under either the piece-rate and tournament
compensation schemes.
Consistent with Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1], men and women perform
equally well in the arithmetic task under both the piece-rate and tournament compen-
sation schemes. Men solve an average of 9.55 tasks under the piece-rate compensation
scheme while women solve 8.58 tasks under the piece-rate compensation scheme. The
null hypothesis that these averages are equal cannot be rejected by a two-sided test
(p=0.233). The results are similar under the tournament compensation scheme. Men
solve an average of 11.42 tasks while women solve 10.13 tasks. Again, the null hy-
pothesis that these averages are equal cannot be rejected by two-sided test (p=0.183).
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Additionally, using a KolmogorovSmirnov test there is no difference in the distribu-
tion of male and female performance on the arithmetic task under either the piece-rate
and tournament compensation schemes (p=0.449 and p=0.287).
Furthermore, there is no difference in male and female performance in the facial
emotion task in either the piece-rate or tournament compensation schemes. Men
correctly identify an average of 8.19 and 9.72 emotions under the piece-rate and tour-
nament compensation schemes, respectively. Similarly, women correctly identify 8.08
and 9.77 emotions under the piece-rate and tournament compensation schemes, re-
spectively. The differences between these figures are not significant using a two-sided
test of averages (p=0.806 and p=0.894) and there is also no statistically significant
difference in the distribution of male and female performance under either compen-
sation scheme using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p=0.413 and p=0.965). Figure 1
and Figure 2 depict the cumulative distribution functions for men and women in both
tasks under both the piece-rate and tournament compensation schemes.
Figure 1.1: There is no difference in male and female performance in either treat-
ment under the piece-rate compensation scheme.
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Figure 1.2: There is no difference in male and female performance in either treat-
ment under the tournament compensation scheme.
Finding 2: In both tasks, both men and women perform sig-
nificantly better in the tournament than in the piece-rate task.
Additionally, for both tasks, there is no gender difference in the
increase in performance between the piece-rate and tournament
compensation schemes.
In both tasks, male and female performances across the piece-rate and tournament
compensation schemes are highly correlated. Additionally, in both tasks, both genders
perform significantly better in the Task 2 tournament (p<0.000 for all four one-sided
hypothesis tests). Furthermore, the improvement in performance from the piece-
rate to the tournament does not differ across genders for either task (p=0.546 for
the arithmetic task and p=0.727 for the facial emotion task). The distributions of
performance improvements across gender are also not statistically different for either
task (p=0.651 and p=0.615).
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Because we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that performance is equal
across genders for both tasks, we can investigate how tournament selection differs
across genders and compare these results to those of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1]
without too much concern that any observed differences are due to gender differences
in performance.
Figure 1.3: There is no difference in the increase in male and female performance
between the piece-rate and tournament compensation schemes in either task.
Finding 3: In the arithmetic task, males enter the Task 3 tour-
nament significantly more than females despite the similar Task
1 and Task 2 performances.
Given the similar performances by men and women under both the piece-rate and
tournament compensation schemes in either task, one might expect, absent a concern
about confidence, tournament entry decisions should also not vary by gender. In
contrast to this logical expectation, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1] observe males
choosing to enter the tournament significantly more than females. In the arithmetic
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task, I find a similar result. While 66% (25/38) of males choose to enter the tour-
nament in Task 3, only 37% (14/38) of females choose to enter the tournament in
Task 3 despite the similar Task 1 and Task 2 performances. This difference in tour-
nament entry rates for the arithmetic task is highly significant using a one-tailed test
of proportions (p=0.006).
Finding 4: In the facial emotion task, 45% more women than
men choose to enter the Task 3 tournament.
In the facial emotion recognition task, the tournament selection results contrast
with those of the arithmetic task. More women than men choose to enter the tour-
nament in the facial emotion recognition task. While 31% (11/36) of men choose
to enter the Task 3 tournament, 45% (16/36) of women choose to enter the Task 3
tournament, a nearly 50% increase. Strikingly, 45% more women than men choose
to enter the tournament in the facial emotion task. A one-tailed test of proportions
(consistent with the directional hypothesis) gives p = 0.112, which is not significant
but is certainly in the right direction.
Figure 3 depicts tournament entry proportions by gender and task. Running a
probit regression of Task 3 compensation choice as a function of a treatment dummy
variable, a gender dummy variable, and an interaction of these two variables al-
lows a test of a test of differences-in-differences between male and female tournament
selection in Task 3. Each of the reported marginal effects is highly significant suggest-
ing there is something systematically different about tournament selection decisions
across tasks (p=0.003, p=0.012, and p=0.009, respectively). A joint hypothesis test
about the effect of gender is significant as well as a joint hypothesis test about the
treatment effect (p=0.020 and p=0.008, respectively).
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Figure 1.4: While significantly more males than females enter the tournament in
the arithmetic task, there is no statistically-significant difference in tournament
entry rates across genders in the facial emotion task.
Finding 5: Tournament entry decisions are not driven by per-
formance differences across gender for either the arithmetic task
or the facial emotion task.
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1] do not find significant evidence that tournament
entry decisions are the result of a difference in performance for those subjects opting
into the tournament and those selecting piece-rate across genders. They do report
a marginal result for a difference in tournament performance between men selecting
into the tournament and men selecting piece-rate. Similarly, for the arithmetic task, I
do not find significant evidence that a difference in performance is responsible for the
tournament selection decision. I find two marginally-significant results. One is the
difference in tournament performance for women who select into the tournament and
women who select the piece-rate (p=0.080). A second is the difference in the increase
in performance from Task 1 to Task 2 for men who enter the tournament versus men
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who select piece-rate (p=0.066). In the facial emotion task, there is no evidence that
performance differences drive tournament entry differences for either gender.
Finding 6: While gender is a significant predictor of the tour-
nament entry decision in the arithmetic task, gender does not
significantly effect the tournament entry decision in the facial
emotion task.
In a probit regression, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1] find that gender was the
only significant predictor of the tournament entry decision, controlling for tournament
performance and the increase in performance from piece-rate to tournament. Table
1 presents my probit regression results. In the arithmetic task, I find very similar
results, with again, only the gender dummy variable yielding a significant coefficient.
However, in the facial emotion task, none of the three variables are significant, in-
cluding gender.
Table 1.1: Probit of Task 3 Tournament Choice
Arithmetic Task Facial Emotions Task
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
Female -0.691** 0.356
(0.023) (0.245)
Tournament Performance 0.051 -0.027
(0.261) (0.788)
Tournament - Piece Rate Performance 0.101 0.127
(0.140) (0.156)
P-values in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Additionally, while past performance does not appear to be driving the difference
in tournament entry, future performance also does not correlate with the tournament
entry decision. There is no evidence of a difference in Task 3 performance for men and
women in either task regardless of the tournament entry decision (p=0.165, p=0.196,
p=0.633, p=0.620).
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Finding 7: Gender differences in confidence across tasks appear
to help explain the difference in tournament entry rates across
genders.
In regards to beliefs about relative performance, while Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007)[1] find that both men are women are overconfident, specifically that men are
more overconfident than women, I find that only men are overconfident in both tasks
using a Fisher’s exact test of independence between the distribution of guess rank
and actual rank (p=0.000 and p=0.030). A Fisher’s exact test of the independence
between the distribution of guessed rank and actual rank for women in the arithmetic
task and the facial emotion task yield p=0.226 and p=0.847, respectively. It does not
appear that women are overconfident in either task. Women appear to be calibrating
their beliefs about their performance correctly, while men fail to calibrate their beliefs
correctly in either tasks.
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1] observe that the guesses of men and women
differ significantly. Using a Fisher’s exact test of independence of the distributions
for men and women, I also observe that the guesses of own rank by men and women
differ significantly at the 10% level (p=0.070) in the arithmetic task, but the guesses
of men and women do not differ significantly in the facial emotion task (p=0.376).
Additionally, while there is little evidence that the distribution of guesses of women
differs across tasks (p=0.131), there is mild evidence that the distribution of guesses
for men differs across tasks (p=0.093). Specifically, men have lower confidence in the
facial emotion task. While 50% of men guess the top rank in the arithmetic task, only
31% of men selected the top rank in the facial emotion task. A one-sided test of a
difference in these proportions yields a significant result (p=0.044). In the arithmetic
task, 24% of women guess the top rank while 42% of women guess the top rank in
23
the facial emotion task. A one-sided test of a difference in proportions is significant
(p=0.049). There does appear to be some evidence that men are losing confidence
while women are gaining confidence in the facial emotion task.
Table 2 presents the results from an ordered probit regression of guessed tour-
nament rank (guessed ranks of 1, 2, or 3, excluding guesses of 4) as a function of
gender, tournament performance, and the increase in performance from piece-rate
to tournament. Both both tasks, I find an insignificant coefficient on the gender
dummy variable, suggesting that once controlling for performance, confidence is sim-
ilar across genders for either task. Furthermore, when running an ordered probit
of guessed tournament rank conditioning on gender and controlling for both tourna-
ment performance and the increase in performance from Task 1 to Task 2, as well
as including a task dummy variable and an interaction between female and the task
dummy variable, I find evidence of a significant difference in confidence across tasks.
There does appear to be a significant treatment effect for women. In particular, the
coefficient on the interaction term is significant at the 10% level (p=0.075). Figure 4
and Figure 5 provide additional qualitative evidence that task affects both male and
female confidence. Specifically, male confidence falls in the facial emotion task while
female confidence increases.
Table 1.2: Ordered Probit of Task 2 Tournament Guessed Ranks
Arithmetic Task Facial Emotions Task Pooled
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
Female 0.337 -0.417 -0.440
(0.300) (0.153) (0.122)
Tournament Performance -0.118** -0.287** -0.150***
(0.031) (0.21) (0.001)
Tournament - Piece Rate Performance -0.190** -0.212*** -0.224***
(0.043) (0.008) (0.000)
Treatment -0.491
(0.104)
Treatment*Female 0.725*
(0.075)
P-values in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3 provides separate probit regressions predicting tournament selection as a
function of gender, tournament performance, the increase in performance from the
piece-rate to the tournament, and guessed tournament rank, a proxy for confidence.
While it appears that the gender gap in tournament selection cannot be explain
by beliefs about relative performance in the arithmetic task, once controlling for
confidence, there exists no gender gap in tournament entry in the facial emotion task.
Due to the finding that there is a treatment effect on confidence across tasks, I tested
a pooled probit regression allowing for the treatment effect as well as an interaction
between the treatment and guessed tournament rank. With this pooled regression,
the gender coefficient is no longer significant (p=0.184), therefore the results suggest
that the difference in tournament entry rates across tasks are driven by a difference
in confidence across tasks.
Table 1.3: Probit of Task 3 Tournament Choice
Arithmetic Task Facial Emotions Task Pooled
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1)
Female -0.692** -0.674** 0.253 0.057 -0.308
(0.033) (0.040) (0.417) (0.864) (0.184)
Tournament Performance 0.027 0.021 -0.007 -0.15 0.008
(0.589) (0.685) (0.948) (0.238) (0.864)
Tournament - Piece Rate Performance 0.059* 0.045 0.105 0.031 0.017
(0.051) (0.619) (0.246) (0.754) (0.789)
Guessed Tournament Rank -0.142 -0.774*** -0.665***
(0.592) (0.003) (0.003)
Treatment -0.364
(0.554)
Treatment*Guessed Tournament Rank 0.419
(0.193)
P-values in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure 1.5: While the guess distribution for males lies above that of females in
the arithmetic task, it appears that the guess distribution for females always lies
above the distribution for males in the facial emotion task.
Figure 1.6: The guess distribution for males in the arithmetic task lies above that
of males in the facial emotion task, while it appears that the guess distribution for
females in the facial emotion task lies above that of females in the arithmetic task.
Finding 8: Controlling for risk preference eliminates the gender
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difference in tournament entry rates in the arithmetic task.
Entering a tournament requires a subject to undertake some level of risk. Research
suggests that levels of risk aversion differ for men and women. Subsequently, the
differing tournament entry rates may be due to a difference in risk preferences. Women
invest significantly less than men. While men invest 69% of their endowment, women
invest roughly 51% of their endowment (p=0.000). This difference is also significant
using a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test (p=0.000).
The probit regressions of Table 4 suggest the observed difference in tournament
entry rates in the arithmetic task mostly vanish when controlling for risk preferences.
A one-sided hypothesis test for the coefficient on female suggests the gender gap still
partially remains (p=0.057). Additionally, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that
there the investment percentage among men who choose the tournament and men who
select piece-rate for either task is equal (p=0.473 and p=0.153). Similarly, I cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the investment percentage among women who choose
the tournament and women who select piece-rate for either task is equal (p=0.672
and p=0.104). Because of these results, risk preference does not seem to be the main
driving force behind the difference in tournament entry rates across tasks.
Table 1.4: Probit of Task 3 Tournament Choice Controlling for Risk Preference
Arithmetic Task Facial Emotions Task
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Female -0.694** -0.581 -0.581 0.254 0.389 0.196
(0.033) (0.113) (0.113) (0.417) (0.239) (0.578)
Tournament Performance 0.027 0.022 0.018 -0.007 0.029 -0.097
(0.589) (0.674) (0.734) (0.948) (0.801) (0.459)
Tournament - Piece Rate Performance 0.059 0.065 0.055 0.105 0.084 0.012
(0.506) (0.464) (0.559) (0.246) (0.375) (0.905)
Percent Invested 0.471 0.406 1.525** 1.349**
(0.499) (0.573) (0.014) (0.040)
Guessed Tournament Rank -0.105 -0.721***
(0.700) (0.007)
P-values in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Finding 9: While there is a significant differences in tournament
selection in Task 4 in the arithmetic task, there is difference in
tournament selection in Task 4 in the facial emotion task.
In Task 4, subjects can select whether to submit their Task 1 piece-rate perfor-
mance to a tournament or to a piece-rate compensation scheme in the event that Task
4 is the task randomly selected for payment. Subjects do not need to complete any
additional tasks in Task 4 so the choice does not involve the prospect of additional
effort. In the arithmetic task, 45% of men select the tournament while only 21%
of women select the tournament. In the facial emotion task, 25% of both men and
women select the tournament. Using a Fisher’s exact test, men and women differ in
their Task 4 choice in the arithmetic task (p=0.050) but not in the facial emotion
task (p=1.000).
Consistent with Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1], there is no difference in piece-
rate performance for women who select the tournament versus women who select
piece-rate in the arithmetic task (9.125 and 8.43, p=0.468). However, there is a
difference in piece-rate performance for men who select the tournament versus men
who select the piece-rate in the arithmetic task (11.76 and 7.76, p=0.004). In the
facial emotion task, there is no difference in performance for individuals who select
the tournament versus the piece-rate compensation scheme for either gender (p=0.692
and p=0.864). These results provide evidence that performance is not driving the
tournament selection decision.
Finding 10: Differences in confidence across genders can explain
the difference in tournament entry rates in Task 4.
Beliefs about relative performance in Task 1 are consistent with beliefs about
relative performance in Task 2. This suggests that the competitive environment is
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not affecting beliefs about relative performance. A Fisher’s exact test again shows
that while men are overconfident in both tasks (p=0.003 and p=0.020), women are
overconfident in neither task (p=0.225 and p=0.193). Again, women are calibrating
correctly while men fail to accurately calibrate beliefs about relative performance.
I observe that the distribution of guesses of men and women differ significantly in
the arithmetic task (p=0.000), but the guesses of men and women do not differ
significantly in the facial emotion task (p=0.326). However, there is evidence that the
distribution of guesses for men differs across tasks (p=0.000) while the distributions
of guess for women does not differ across tasks (p=0.880). While it appears that men
are overconfident in both tasks, I do not observe the difference in tournament entry
rates for men and women across both tasks.
Table 5 presents results from an ordered probit regression of guessed piece-rate
rank (guessed ranks of 1, 2, or 3, excluding guesses of 4) on gender and piece-rate
performance. I find a significant coefficient on the gender dummy variable, suggesting
that despite controlling for performance, there remains a gender difference in confi-
dence for both tasks. In particular, women guess significantly lower ranks than men
in the arithmetic task, while women guess significant higher ranks than men in the
facial emotion task. Furthermore, running an ordered probit regression of guessed
piece-rate rank, conditioning on gender and controlling for piece-rate performance, I
find evidence of a difference in male confidence across tasks but not a difference in
female confidence across tasks. Specifically, the highly significant coefficient on the
treatment variable in column 3 of Table 5 illustrates that men are significantly less
confident in the facial emotion task than the arithmetic task.
Table 6 presents probit regression results that suggest controlling for confidence
eliminates the observed gender gap in tournament selection.
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Table 1.5: Ordered Probit of Task 1 Piece Rate Guessed Ranks
Arithmetic Task Facial Emotions Task Males Females
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Female 1.050*** -0.545*
(0.000) (0.075)
Piece Rate Performance -0.201*** -0.278*** -0.274*** -0.156**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019)
Treatment -1.299*** 0.204
(0.000) (0.469)
P-values in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 1.6: Probit of Task 4 Tournament Choice
Arithmetic Task Facial Emotions Task
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Female -0.567* -0.323 0.001 -0.231
(0.076) (0.354) (0.997) (0.503)
Piece-Rate Performance 0.138*** 0.077 0.018 -0.086
(0.005) (0.178) (0.831) (0.380)
Guessed Piece-Rate Rank -0.567** -0.574**
(0.033) (0.029)
P-values in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Despite controlling for confidence, risk, and feedback aversion through the de-
cision to submit one’s piece-rate score to a tournament and beliefs about relative
performance in the tournament, Table 7 illustrates that there is still a gender gap in
tournament performance in the arithmetic task, significant at the 10% level. While
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1] take this as evidence that women and men differ in
their preference for competition, this statement needs clarification. This gender gap
is not observed in the facial emotion task and is eliminated when controlling for the
treatment effect on confidence. A restatement of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)[1]
is that a difference in preference for competition across genders is only part of the
story. A difference in beliefs about future performance appears to significantly affect
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tournament selection decisions across genders.
Table 1.7: Probit of Task 3 Tournament Choice
Arithmetic Task Facial Emotions Task
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Female -0.694** -0.674** -0.622* 0.254 0.057 0.083
(0.033) (0.040) (0.062) (0.417) (0.864) (0.806)
Tournament Performance 0.027 0.021 0.013 -0.007 -0.150 -0.128
(0.589) (0.685) (0.814) (0.948) (0.238) (0.319)
Tournament - Piece Rate Performance 0.059 0.045 0.079 0.105 0.031 0.049
(0.506) (0.619) (0.429) (0.246) (0.754) (0.635)
Guessed Tournament Rank -0.142 -0.068 -0.774*** -0.750***
(0.592) (0.341) (0.003) (0.004)
Submitting the Piece Rate 0.359 0.443
(0.341) (0.242)
P-values in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
1.6 Discussion
My data confirm that altering subject beliefs through the perception of the task
significantly affects tournament entry rates. While more men than women enter the
tournament with the male stereotype task, more women than men enter the tourna-
ment with the female stereotype task, though this difference is not significant. This
observed difference seems to be working through the confidence channel. My results
provide evidence that male confidence decreases while female confidence increases
in the female stereotype task leading to similar tournament entry rates across gen-
ders. I find evidence that a gender difference in beliefs about future performance may
be driving the observed gender gap in tournament selection as opposed to a gender
difference in pure preference for competition.
Performance in both the arithmetic task and the facial emotion task are consistent
across genders regardless of compensation scheme. Because we do not observe a
significant difference in performance across genders for either task, this observed
difference in tournament entry rates does not appear to be driven by a performance
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difference, further supporting my results.
One might be concerned that while men were more confident than women in the
arithmetic task as expected, there was no difference in male and female confidence
in the facial emotion task. Why do we not observed overconfidence for women in the
facial emotion task? As Lundeberg et al. (1994)[2] succinctly put it, “...the problem
may not be that women necessarily lack confidence, but that in some cases men have
too much confidence especially when they are wrong!” Additionally, Lundeberg et al.
(1994)[2] note that women are much more able to calibrate their confidence than men.
Because men are unable to fully calibrate their confidence, it may look like they are
just as confident as women, but the real result lies in the increase in the confidence
of women through correct calibration.
Ideally, one would hope women would enter a tournament more than men when
the task is in their favor, but as Lundeberg et al. (1994)[2] note, men are consistently
overconfident when they have no reason to be. The facial emotion task carries a
very strong female gender stereotype, but it may take a task with an even stronger
female stereotype for female tournament entry rates to exceed that of males. While
it might be possible to find a more female-stereotyped task, any such task would be
most useful if there is equal performance across genders.
1.7 Conclusion
Much research suggests that women avoid competition even when it can be bene-
ficial and many researchers conclude that women differ in their preference for compe-
tition compared to men. My study explores the potential that another channel may
be yielding the observed gender gap in tournament selection: a gender difference in
beliefs about future performance.
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My findings suggest that the observed difference in behavioral responses to compe-
tition among men and women is not due to a difference in preference for competition,
but rather a difference in beliefs about future performance, evidence through the
response to changing the task gender stereotype. Women are opting out of competi-
tions when the selected task carries a connotation of male dominance, an environment
where women would carry lower beliefs about future performance. I find that when
the task carries a female stereotype, more women than men choose to enter the tour-
nament. It appears an increase in female confidence and decrease in male confidence
is driving this result.
Despite the fact that women earn roughly 57% of awarded bachelor’s degrees,
women occupy only 21 of the CEO positions for S&P 500 companies. While women
are clearly capable of top positions, we are still not observing women seeking out these
positions at rate similar to men. This study suggests that this observed difference
may result from the gender stereotype of CEO positions. A Google image search of
the word “CEO” produces only three images of females in the first 100 results.
The same thinking follows for the lack of women in STEM fields. Research suggests
men can outnumber women as much as four to one in computer science classes while
in non-STEM courses, women generally outnumber men. As discussed above, math
and science are predominately viewed as male fields and given my results, it is again
not surprising to observe this disparity. This study suggests that policy interventions
regarding gender-stereotyped tasks might indeed be useful and that more research is
needed.
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Chapter 2
Gender, Emotions, and
Tournament Performance in the
Laboratory
2.1 Introduction
Many employees face competition within the workplace. Job promotions, awards
such as employee of the month, or incentive pay for top performers are a few of the
common tournament structures employed in many workplaces.1 Additionally, em-
ployee interaction outside of the workplace is increasingly common. A study recently
published by Millennial Branding found that individuals between the ages of 18 to 29
1Using a survey of 15,000 employed Americans, re-weighted to match the census tracts, Bo Cowgill
(2015)[38] finds that roughly 77% of Americans face intra-worker competition that is a significant
component of wage determination. Cowgill points out that a significant number of large firms are
known to use some form of tournament for promotions. A few of the listed firms include Adobe, AIG,
Amazon, American Express, Cisco Systems, Conoco, Dow Chemical, Enron, Expedia, Facebook,
Ford, General Electric, GlaxoSmithKline, Goldman Sachs, Goodyear Tire, Google, Hewlett-Packard,
IBM, Intel, LendingTree, Lucent, Microsoft, Motorola, Sun Microsystems Valve, and Yahoo.
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are friends with an average of 16 co-workers on Facebook.2 Garcia et al. (2013)[40]
cite personal history as a potential influence on competitive behavior and note that
situational factors can come into play where comparison and competitiveness are
found within what the authors label “Social Category Fault Lines.
I use a controlled laboratory setting to enhance understanding of how emotions
towards other individuals affect tournament performance as well as how the behavioral
findings may differ across genders. Behavioral responses to emotions, tournament
performance, and gender differences have been studied separately but there is little
research that combines all three of these variables. My study adds to the body
of research in that it aims to assess emotion, tournament performance, and gender
differences simultaneously.
While individual emotions can be significantly dynamic and complex outside the
laboratory, the anonymity of the laboratory allows me to observe the specific impact
of laboratory induced emotions on individual behavior in the presence of competition,
and how the impact on behavior differs across genders. Specifically, I test how neg-
ative interpersonal experiences affect performance in competitive situations, while
controlling for the level of negativity and gender. My study provides a setting in
which women are found to respond positively to the presence of a tournament while
men are unaffected.
I conducted a two-stage laboratory experiment. In the first stage, a four-person
public goods game was used to generate a range of emotions. Subjects observed
the individual contribution decisions of all group members and then I asked them
to state their feeling about each group member on a scale of one to five, where one
indicated strongly negative feelings and five reflected strongly positive feelings. The
2Furthermore, CBS News[39] noted that “work and life are a mishmash now.”
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second stage consisted of a one-on-one tournament using a real-effort task where the
assigned opponent is a group member from the public goods game. The opponent
remained the same for all five rounds of the tournament, and subjects were informed
about the selected opponent’s identity prior to the start of the tournament. Between
tournament rounds, subjects were informed whether their number of completed tasks
exceeded the number of completed tasks of their opponent but not how many tasks
the opponent completed.
By comparing individual performance in the tournament across the reported feel-
ings, I determined if and how emotions affect tournament performance. Specifically,
the experiment investigated if an individual who was matched with an opponent he
rated as strongly negative responded with increased performance, compared to an
individual matched with a less negatively rated opponent. Additionally, because gen-
der may affect tournament behavior, the study tested how behavior differs between
men and women, particularly while controlling for the level of emotion. I found that
strongly negative emotions positively affect performance for women but not for men.
This observed difference is not due to a difference in the intensity of the generated
emotion across genders.
In previous studies, Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000a, 2002)[41][42] show that strong neg-
ative emotions bring about a desire to punish free-riding in public goods games and,
if given the opportunity, subjects choose to undertake costly punishment a significant
portion of the time, even when there is no direct monetary benefit to the subject.
In a survey on observed reciprocity in the literature, Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000b)[43]
mention numerous other studies also suggesting that negative reciprocity arises out of
a desire to punish “hostile intentions” (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Blount, 1995; Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger, 1999; and Falk and Fischbacher, 1999). In my study, punishment
36
takes the form of increased effort in a real effort task so as to increase the probability
of winning the tournament and therefore the other person losing the tournament.
While emotions can influence individual behavior, the effect of this influence may
differ between men and women. Bettencourt and Miller (1996)[44] show through
a meta-analysis that while unprovoked males are more aggressive than unprovoked
females, this difference is significantly reduced when both genders are provoked. In
a review of the literature on gender differences, Croson and Gneezy (2009)[45] note
many observed differences between men and women that are consistent across the
data; however, the data on gender differences in public good contributions is mixed.
They state that some studies show that women are more pro-social in a public goods
game than men (e.g., Seguino, Stevens, and Lutz, 1996), whereas other studies find
the opposite (e.g, Brown-Kruse and Hummels, 1993; Sell and Wilson, 1991; and
Solow and Kirkwood, 2002). The authors note that psychological research indicates
that women are more sensitive to social cues and therefore may respond differently
depending on the experimental design. In my study, I look at how emotions affect
behavioral response to a tournament environment, specifically when these emotions
are connected to the other individuals in the tournament.
Combining gender differences and tournament performance, Gneezy, Niederle, and
Rustichini (2003)[10] demonstrate that males respond more strongly than females to
a tournament environment by increasing effort while female effort remains unchanged
or decreases across piece-rate versus tournament environments. Additionally, Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007)[1] show that, when given the option of compensation from ei-
ther a piece-rate scheme or a tournament, males choose the tournament environment
significantly more than females. The authors show that even when the tournament
may be beneficial for high performing females, women tend to avoid competitive tasks.
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Similarly, in a study of elementary school children, Gneezy and Rustichini (2004a)[11]
assess the running speed of boys and girls in both competitive and noncompetitive
environments. They find no difference in running speed between boys and girls in the
noncompetitive environment, but do find a significant increase in the running speed
of the boys when presented as a competition, while the running speed of the girls did
not change significantly, thus creating a significant gender gap in competition perfor-
mance. In contrast, a recent study by Cassar, Wordofa, and Zhang (2016)[23] finds
that the gender gap in tournament selection is erased when incentives benefit one’s
child such as workplace daycare as opposed to monetary. This recent study provides
evidence that there may not be an actual difference in preference for competition be-
tween males and females but rather that in the right environment and with properly
aligned incentives, women can be enticed to compete as vigorously as men. Addi-
tionally, a difference in beliefs about future performance may be responsible for the
observed difference in tournament entry rates across genders rather than a difference
in preference for competition. Using a female stereotyped task, I find no difference in
tournament entry rates across genders while I do find a difference in tournament entry
rates across genders using a male stereotyped task (Halladay, 2016)[24]. This suggests
a difference in beliefs about future performance is the channel which differences in
tournament entry rates across genders is operating.
To the best of my knowledge, Gneezy and Imas (2014)[46] is the only experi-
ment combining emotion and tournament performance. The authors find that with
a strength-based task, anger improves performance. However, their all-male subject
pool does not allow for the analysis of gender differences.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines my experimental design while
section 3 explores my hypotheses and predictions. I present my results in section 4
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and discuss the implications of these results in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design
The experiment takes place in two stages. The first stage presents a situation that
can trigger feelings in the laboratory, both positive and negative, while the second
stage is a tournament.3 Participants do not learn about the nature of the second
stage until after the conclusion of the first stage.
In the first stage, experimental subjects are randomly placed into groups of four to
play a one-shot public goods game with voluntary contributions. Prior to the alloca-
tion stage, subjects learn how to calculate payoffs through a series of examples. Also,
I require that subjects successfully calculate payoffs for two hypothetical scenarios
on their own before the first stage begins. Subjects start with $7.00, total contri-
butions are multiplied by 1.6, and then distributed equally to all group members.
Additionally, subjects are told that all contribution decisions will be revealed to the
group with identification by subject ID numbers. After allocation choices, subjects
learn their own payoffs and the contributions and payoffs of the other three group
members. Subsequently, subjects provide feedback about their feelings regarding the
other three group members using a five-point scale. A rating of one indicates strongly
negative feelings, and a rating of five indicates strongly positive feelings. A rating
of three denotes neutral feelings, neither positive nor negative. I include the neutral
feelings rating option in the event that a subject does not feel they can rate a group
member. A screen shot of this zTree screen can be found in the appendix.
For the second stage, I match each participant with one other participant from
3Previous research provides evidence that the public goods game environment successfully gen-
erates emotions (Fehr & Ga¨chter, 2002)[42].
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their original group of four for five rounds of a slider task using a tournament payment
scheme (Gill & Prowse, 2009)[47]. Participants are informed about the subject ID
(e.g., Person 1) of the selected individual on the instructions screen for the second
stage. I followed essentially the same procedures as Charness and Villeval (2009,
AER)[48]. This design is also similar to many studies that use a matching groups
protocol (e.g., Charness, 2000[49]; Greiner and Vittoria Levati, 2005[50]; Charness,
Fre´chette, and Qin, 2007[51]).
After reading the instructions, but before beginning the tournament, I remind
subjects of the results of the first stage and the ratings they assigned to each group
member. In each of the five rounds, participants have 90 seconds to complete as many
slider tasks as possible. A slider bar is complete if the subject slides the marker exactly
to the halfway position (50). Initially, subjects see a screen displaying 48 slider bars.
If the subject completes all 48 slider bars within the 90 seconds, I give subjects an
additional 48 slider bars to complete to ensure performance is not constrained. As the
round progresses, the screen displays how many sliders the subject has successfully
completed. A screen shot depicting this zTree screen can be found in the appendix.
A participant wins the tournament round if he completed more slider tasks than his
opponent. At the end of each round, each participant learns whether he won the
tournament but not how many tasks the matched person completed. Participants
were told that one of the five tournament rounds would be randomly selected for
payment in addition to the public goods game payoff. If the participant won the
selected round, he receives $2.50. Total payment consisted of the payoff from the first
stage and the result of the tournament. Subjects earned $8.36 on average from the
public goods game.
My design follows a between-subjects design. I conducted three treatments: posi-
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tive feelings (PF), negative feelings (NF), and median feelings (MF). In the PF treat-
ment, individuals were matched with the group member they rated most positively,
while in the NF treatment, individuals were matched with the group member they
rated most negatively. In the MF treatment, individuals were matched with the
group member they rated intermediately compared to the other two group members.4
Treatments did not vary within sessions.
This experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007)[33]. All sessions
took place in the Experimental and Behavioral Economics Laboratory at the Univer-
sity of California, Santa Barbara. I used the Universitys ORSEE system to recruit
subjects, and all were current students. A total of 180 students participated. I ran
a total of 12 sessions with each session having either 12 or 16 subjects (three or
four groups). 64 subjects participated in the PF treatment, 72 participated in the
NF treatment, and 44 participated in the MF treatment. No subject participated in
more than one session or more than one treatment. Average earnings were $9.84 and
each session lasted approximately 45 minutes. A set of instructions can be found in
the Appendix.
2.3 Hypotheses
This experiment addresses three main hypotheses about how individuals behave
in a competitive environment with someone with whom they have some recent expe-
rience. Rational economic theory suggests that effort in the competition should be
unaffected by the results of the first stage unless first stage contributions to the pub-
4For example, I rate my three group members 1, 4, and 5. In the PF treatment, I would be
matched with the individual I rated a 5. In the NF treatment, I would be matched with the
individual I rated a 1. In the MF treatment, I would be matched with the individual I rated a 4. If
two individuals received the same rating, one was randomly assigned as the opponent.
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lic goods game are informative about the opponent’s second stage performance/effort
choice. If, for example, individuals who are viewed as strongly negative are also more
likely to exert higher levels of effort, opponents might respond to the higher expected
effort levels by also increasing their own effort.
Will the opportunity to compete with an individual who has generated negative
feelings for a subject lead to increased performance? This kind of behavior would be
evidence of negative reciprocity. Previous studies show that in public goods games,
individuals will punish free riders if given the chance, even when punishment is costly
(Fehr & Ga¨chter, 2000a)[41]. Though this experiment does not allow for direct pun-
ishment, subjects can increase performance as a means of punishing a non-cooperator.
While previous work has focused on punishment through reducing one’s own payoff,
another form of punishment is increasing one’s probability of winning a tournament
and thus reducing the payoff of the other individual through increased real effort. In
another experiment allowing for sanctions, Fehr and Ficshbacher (2004)[52] find that
negative emotions drive sanctioning decisions that promote more pro-social behavior.
Additionally, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986)[53] find evidence of punishment
through indirect reciprocity when subjects chose to forgo a larger payoff for them-
selves to punish an individual who had previously acted unfairly. As seen in Garcia
et al. (2013)[40], the history between two parties can significantly affect competi-
tive behavior. The first stage of this experiment may indirectly draw social category
fault lines dividing cooperators and free-riders. It is plausible to consider that given
an individuals negative feelings, these emotions may ‘light a fire’, so that he may
seek to ‘let off steam’, or desire to reestablish dominance, all resulting in increased
performance. However, I will be unable to distinguish if this observed increase in
performance arises in part from being previously hurt financially by someone, or in
42
part from being matched with someone who harms you by violating a social norm. I
present this explicitly now:
Hypothesis 1: The number of completed slider tasks will be
higher for individuals if and only if they are matched in the
tournament with someone about whom they reported strongly
negative feelings.
Previous research demonstrates that it is much easier to find evidence of nega-
tive reciprocity than evidence of positive reciprocity. The lack of evidence of positive
reciprocity in their data led Charness and Rabin (2002)[54] to not even include pos-
itive reciprocity as an explanation for behavior in their model. In an experimental
labor market, Charness (2004)[55] finds strong evidence of negative reciprocity when
employer-assigned wages are low, but no significant evidence of positive reciprocity
when employer-assigned wages are high. Additionally, Offerman (2002)[56] provides
evidence that individuals respond more strongly to negative intentions as opposed to
positive intentions as the result of a self-serving bias. Individuals tend to view posi-
tive outcomes as a positive reflection of themselves while they tend to view negative
outcomes as a negative reflection of others. Fehr & Ga¨chter (2000a)[41] demon-
strate through punishment in a public goods game that “...there is a large drop in
punishments if an individuals contribution is close to the averageThus, the more an
individuals contribution falls short of the average the more she gets punished.” If low
contributions are viewed more negatively confirming Hypothesis 1, consistent with
Fehr & Ga¨chter, I hypothesize that I should only observe the increase in performance
for individuals competing with someone toward whom they have strongly negative
feelings. Succinctly:
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Hypothesis 2: There will be no difference in the the number of
completed slider tasks across all other reported feelings other
than strongly negative feelings.
Gneezy and Rustichini (2004)[11], find no gender differences in speed when chil-
dren run alone but do find that boys outperform girls when running in mixed-gender
pairs providing further evidence that males tend to be more responsive to competitive
environments. Additionally, Buser and Dreber (2014)[57] show that under a piece-rate
payment scheme, men significantly outperform women in the slider task. Therefore,
with the combination of the male dominant task and the competition driven male per-
formance, I hypothesize that men will outperform women independent of emotion.
To summarize:
Hypothesis 3: The number of completed slider tasks will be
higher for men than for women, holding reported emotion con-
stant.
Lastly, previous research yields inconsistent evidence regarding which gender will
be most affected by the emotions. Eckel and Grossman (2005)[58] find that women
are more likely to punish unfair behavior than men. In contrast, Christensen et al.
(1983)[59] find evidence that in romantic relationships, males exhibit a stronger self-
serving bias, and they may be more apt to engage in negative reciprocity. Hence,
there is no clear prediction about behavior in this respect.
2.4 Results
My subject pool was 43.64% male. Subjects contributed an average of $2.25 (32%
of the endowment) during the public goods game. The average rating of feelings
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towards the matched opponent over all treatments was 2.9 and the average assigned
rating across all group members was 2.89.5 Table 1 presents the breakdown of oppo-
nent ratings by treatment while Table 2 presents the breakdown of opponent ratings
by gender. Average tournament performance was 25.07 tasks across all five rounds.
Table 2.1: Opponent Rating by Treatment
Opponent Rating
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 Overall
Negative Feelings 27 19 22 3 1 72
Middle Feelings 4 6 16 13 3 42
Positive Feelings 4 4 19 15 22 64
Overall 29 57 31 26 178
Table 2.2: Opponent Rating by Gender
Opponent Rating
Gender 1 2 3 4 5 Overall
Female 19 17 31 18 15 100
Male 16 12 26 13 11 78
Finding 1: Higher (lower) contributions do lead to higher (lower)
ratings.
My data confirm that individuals view low contributions negatively. There is
a clear positive relationship between contribution and average rating assigned as
shown in Figure 1. A test of correlation between contribution and rating assignment
affirms the relationship that subjects negatively view low contributions (ρ = 0.5435,
p<0.0000). Using Figure 2, I check for average contribution given a rating across
5This slight difference is due to unequal treatment sizes. I had 72 subjects in the negative feelings
treatment, 64 subjects in the positive feelings treatment, and 42 subjects in the middle feelings
treatment. My goal was to have the same number of subjects in the negative feelings treatment as
the positive feelings treatment, but based on no-show subjects and the need for groups of 4 for the
public goods game, I ended up having 2 extra groups in the negative feelings treatment compared
to the positive feelings treatment. Because changes in behavior tend to observable at the extremes,
I planned on less subjects in the middle feelings treatment.
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genders to determine if there is a gender difference when assigning ratings based on
contribution levels. Confirmed by pair-wise t-tests, there is no evidence that women
and men have different thresholds for assigning a specific rating. Figure 3 suggests
that contributions that fall below the group average are viewed negatively, while
contributions matching or exceed the group average are viewed positively, further
evidence that lower contributions lead to lower ratings.
Figure 4 illustrates that there is also no gender difference in contributions to the
first stage public goods game. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test used to detect a difference
in the distribution of public goods game contributions for men and women is not
significant (p=0.147) and therefore there is no evidence that there exists a gender
difference in the distribution of contributions. Also, a test of the equality of means
for average public goods game contributions can also not be rejected (p=0.170) such
that there is no evidence that average contributions diff across genders.
Figure 2.1: Persons who contributed more in the public goods game generated
more positive emotions in others.
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Figure 2.2: Persons who contributed more in the public goods game generated
more positive emotions in both males and females. There is no difference in ratings
assigned by males and females conditional on opponent contribution to the public
goods game.
Figure 2.3: Negative deviations from the average group contribution generated
negative emotions while positive deviations from the average group contribution
generated neutral or positive emotions
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Figure 2.4: There is no difference in average male and female public goods game
contributions nor is there a difference in the distribution of male and female public
goods game contributions.
Because subjects receive feedback between tournament rounds, the forthcoming
analysis will proceed using only data from the first period in order to avoid learning
and feedback effects. For example, Gneezy and Rustichini (2004)[11] demonstrate that
in the presence of relative performance feedback, the performance of boys increased
while the performance of girls was unaffected. Using International Tennis Federation
data, David Wozniak (2012)[60] finds that while males are influenced by performance
over many periods and their behavior seems to reflect a belief in a “hot hand”, females
are influenced by their most recent tournament performance. Additionally, previous
work in psychology has shown that women view their success as the result of good luck
while men view their success as the result of their own ability. Further, research as
shown that emotional responses tend to die out over time, and therefore the all period
analysis may fail to capture to behavioral responses tied to the reported emotions.
Grimm and Mengel (2011)[61] find that low ultimatum game offers are accepted 60-
80% of the time when subjects are given a ten minute delay prior to the rejection
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decision, whereas these low offers are only accepted 20% of the time without a delay.
An additional concern about the confounds of the all period analysis is that it will
be impossible to disentangle the behavioral responses due to the first stage induced
emotions and the behavioral responses due to the feedback induced emotions. Not
only will the emotions from the first stage diminish, but it will be unclear when and
to what extent the feedback emotions take over. While the results using only period
one and all five periods are relatively consistent, it is clear that the results from all
five rounds are potentially confounded due to the between round feedback and the
time elapsed. The analysis using all five rounds is available in the appendix.
While Table 3 illustrates there is an effect when running the regression analysis
using the randomly assigned treatment, the effects are weaker because, as shown
in Table 1, there are still subjects matched in the tournament with an individual
assigned the strongly negative rating despite being in the MF or PF treatments.
Therefore, using the treatment variable is a much noisier, however still significant,
signal of reported feelings.6 The average opponent rating in the NF treatment was
2.06, 3.12 in the MF treatment, and 3.73 in the PF treatment. All of three of these
pair-wise tests of the equality of means are significant (p≤0.008). It does appear
that the treatment captured a difference in opponent ratings but is clearly a noisier
signal. The remaining analysis will group data into bins by assigned opponent rating
as opposed to treatment.
Finding 2: Performance is higher for individuals competing with
someone rated as strongly negative.
6Suppose a subject is in a group with individuals who all contribute their entire endowment.
This subject is most likely going to report positive feelings for all group members. Therefore, even
if this subject is in the negative feelings treatment, they did not experience negative feelings and
should therefore not be grouped with other individuals who did.
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Table 2.3: OLS Regression Results
Completed
Slider Tasks
Subject Contribution 0.832*
(0.425)
Male 4.302**
(1.732)
Negative Feelings Treatment 1.167**
(0.410)
Positive Feelings Treatment -2.070**
(0.780)
Constant 6.958***
(1.880)
R2 0.1284
N 178
Session Dummies Yes
Demographics Yes
*p<0.10, **p<0.05. P-values are two-
sided. Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered by session.
Figure 2.5: Average performance increases significantly when one strongly dislikes
their opponent (assigned a rating of one)
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Figure 2.6: Average performance increases significantly when one strongly dislikes
their opponent (assigned a rating of one)
Not controlling for gender, average performance is higher for individuals whose
opponents received ratings of one (strongly negative feelings) compared to ratings
two through five. For the individuals matched with an opponent rated one, average
performance was 15.91. For opponents rated two through five, average performance
was 12.79, 10.79, 11.00, and 12.54, respectively. This sharp increase in performance is
illustrated in Figure 5, and a two-sided t-test comparing the difference in performance
for subjects matched with an opponent who received a rating of one versus grouping
subjects matched with opponents who received ratings greater than one (Figure 6) is
significant (p=0.0169).7 I have clear evidence that strongly negative personal history
significantly increases competitive behavior.
These results are in line with Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000a)[41] where punishment
and negative emotions both intensify the larger the negative deviation from the
group average. In Figure 3, I demonstrated that ratings of one and two pertained to
7Regressing performance on opponent rating, I find a significant and negative trend using a one-
sided test (p=0.041), further demonstrating the increase in performance when competing with an
opponent one rated as strongly negative.
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below-average contributions while ratings three through five reflected above-average
contributions. Keeping with Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000a)[41], I would expect to see
punishment when the contributions are below average, but not necessarily when the
contribution is close to the group average. The average group deviation for opponents
rated strongly negative (a rating of one) was -$1.80 and the deviation for opponents
rated somewhat negative (a rating of two) was -$1.08. Both of these values are signif-
icantly different from zero and negative, however, in terms of potential contribution
values, because subjects were restricted to contributing whole numbers, a deviation of
one from the group average does not seem to indicate a significant deviation. There-
fore similar to Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000a)[41], I would not expect to see an increase
in effort for individuals matched with subjects rated somewhat negative. However, it
seems plausible that because the range of potential contributions was only [0,7] inclu-
sive, a deviation of roughly two from the group average would be viewed much more
significantly. As with Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002)[42], this is where I would expect to
see the increase in punishment. These results support Hypothesis 1 that performance
will increase when competing with someone about whom you feel strongly negative.
Finding 3: Performance only increases significantly when the
behavior of the opponent is particularly flagrant.
Using a KruskalWallis test for a difference in median performance among individ-
uals competing with subjects rated two through five, I find that there is no difference
in effort among these four groups (p=0.4168). Additionally, a Kruskal-Wallis test
for a difference in median performance across all ratings is marginally significant,
suggesting at least one of the medians differs (p=0.0813). It must be then that this
difference lies in the median performance of individuals competing with an opponent
viewed strongly negative. One-sided pairwise t-tests tests produce relatively consis-
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tent results with the mean performance of individuals competing with a subject rated
one being significantly different than subjects rated three, four or five (p=0.0115,
p=0.0277, p=0.0891, respectively). The p-value on the one-sided t-test comparing
average performance of individuals with opponents rated one and opponents rated
two is very close to marginally significant at 0.1031. All t-tests comparing opponents
of ratings two through five could not reject the null hypothesis of no difference in
average performance. Behavior is unaffected when the emotions involved are not
strongly negative, confirming Hypothesis 2.
Figure 2.7: Average performance increases significantly when one strongly dislikes
their opponent (assigned a rating of one)
Finding 4: Male performance is higher than female performance.
Looking at average effort by gender, my data supports the hypothesis that men
compete more and have higher performance in the tournament. Average male perfor-
mance is 14.85 tasks while average female performance is 10.52 tasks. This difference
is significant using a one-sided t-test (p=0.0015). The creators of the slider task, Gill
and Prowse, provide evidence that within their subject pool, male and female be-
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havior was not significantly different. By the final round, men completed 25.75 tasks
on average while women complete 26.83 tasks on average. Figure 7 corroborates this
finding, illustrating that male performance is above the performance of females for
every reported emotion other than strongly negative emotions.
Finding 5: Women respond more strongly to negative emotions.
Figure 8 allows a comparison in performance for opponent ratings of one versus
ratings above one by gender. The t-tests in Table 4 illustrate five results. All p-values
presented in Table 4 are two-sided unless otherwise specified. Male performance rises
by 0.98 tasks (p=0.7430) on average when the emotions are strongly negative while
female performance rises by 6.96 tasks (p=0.0012) on average in response to the
strongly negative emotions. In the absence of strongly negative emotions, males
perform 5.45 tasks (p=0.0004) more than females, however, with strongly negative
emotions, this difference falls to 0.53 tasks (p=0.8850). All of these results hold
as well using a Fisher’s exact test on the difference in medians. The gender gap
in competition performance is eliminated in the presence of this strongly negative
emotional stimulus. Women seem to be responding to the emotion more significantly
than men. This notion is confirmed by the difference-in-differences estimate provided
in the regression results of column 4 on Table 5 (p=0.098). The observed increase in
performance when competing with a negatively viewed opponent appears to be purely
driven by the female response as male performance is unaffected. Though men are
more competitive across the board, negative emotions appear to evoke a “competitive
fire in women. A similar analysis comparing performance across subjects who were
“badly wronged” in the public goods game can be found in the appendix.
Lastly, it is worth noting that aggregate performance is significantly higher for
pairs with one member viewed strongly negative. In pairs with the opponent assigned
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Figure 2.8: The increase in female performance in the presence of the strongly
negative emotions is driving the overall observed performance increase.
Table 2.4: Difference in Means
Group 1 Group 1 Group 2 Group 2 Difference in Means Difference in Medians
Mean Perf. Mean Perf. (p-value) (p-value)
All Subjects (Rating>1) 11.56 All Subjects (Rating=1) 15.91 4.35** 4.00**
(0.0169) (0.023)
Males (Rating>1) 14.65 Males (Rating=1) 15.63 0.98 2.00
(0.7430) (0.401)
Females (Rating>1) 9.20 Females (Rating=1) 16.16 6.96*** 4.00*
(0.0012) (0.073)
Females (Rating=1) 16.16 Males (Rating=1) 15.63 0.53 1.00
(0.8850) (1.00)
Females (Rating>1) 9.20 Males (Rating>1) 14.65 5.45*** 3.00***
(0.0004) (0.004)
P-values in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
a rating of one, aggregate performance is 4.4 tasks higher than in pairs without. This
difference is significant using a one-sided t-test (p=0.0423).
Regressions in Table 5 support the above results. All regressions included session
dummy variables and demographic variables including whether a subject had been
in an economics experiment previously, if the subject was an economics/accounting
major, and standard errors were clustered on the session level. By including both
session dummy variables and clustering on the session level I am essentially producing
the first stage of the Donald & Lang (2007)[62] two-step correction in the presence of
a small number of clusters. I do not need to worry about the second stage because
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the second stage yields coefficient estimates for coefficients of interest that are session
specific of which I have none.
Table 2.5: OLS Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Completed Completed Completed Completed
Slider Tasks Slider Tasks Slider Tasks Slider Tasks
Subject Contribution 0.679* 0.607 0.647 0.621
(0.357) (0.370) (0.386) (0.375)
Male 4.353** 4.230** 4.234** 5.461**
(1.778) (1.833) (1.799) (1.614)
Negative Feeling Dummy 2.072
(1.853)
Positive Feeling Dummy 1.419
(1.208)
Strongly Negative 3.828 3.282 5.977*
(2.154) (1.928) (3.207)
Somewhat Negative 0.528
(1.979)
Somewhat Positive 0.801
(2.010)
Strongly Positive 2.263
(2.251)
Strongly Negative*Male -5.940*
(3.289)
Constant 6.968** 6.926** 7.352** 7.051**
(2.852) (2.878) (2.175) (2.196)
R2 0.1347 0.1456 0.1413 0.1551
N 178 178 178 178
Session Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
*p<0.10, **p<0.05. P-values are two-sided. Standard errors in parentheses. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by session.
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In model (1), I created a dummy variable for opponents rated one or two (strongly
negative and somewhat negative, respectively), and another dummy variable for op-
ponents rated four or five (somewhat positive and strongly positive, respectively). I
left those with an opponent rated three (neither positive nor negative feelings) as the
reference group. Neither of these coefficients were significant which is not surprising
given the graphical evidence above demonstrating that this performance increase is
found only for those individuals competing with someone rated strongly negative.
I used model (2) to include dummy variables for all the rating categories, leaving
the neither positive nor negative category as the reference group. The strongly neg-
ative category was the only close to significant coefficient (p=0.103) when compared
to the reference group using a two-sided hypothesis test, and is significant at the
10% level using a one-sided test. Subjects competing with a strongly disliked (rat-
ing of one) individual completed roughly four additional tasks compared to subjects
competing with an individual with a rating of three.
This confirms the pattern in Figure 5 where the only spike in performance was
evident with individuals whose opponents were viewed as strongly negative. The
positive coefficient for strongly negative feelings is marginally insignificant using a
two-sided test (p=0.117), however with a one-sided hypothesis test like the one of
interest, I would obtain a significant coefficient at the 10% level. It appears that
something is masking the observed increase in performance such as a gender difference
driven by an increase in female performance. A simple difference-in-differences should
clear this up.
I included an interaction term between the dummy variable for male and the
dummy variable for strongly negative feelings to test if the reaction to emotional
stimulus was different for men and women. The negative and significant coefficient
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provides evidence that given an individual is competing with someone viewed as
strongly negative, women increase performance by roughly six tasks more than men
in the presence of the emotional stimulus. This result corroborates Figure 8 and the
t-tests presented in Table 4 that females are driving the increase in performance and
are much more responsive to the negative emotions. Interestingly, as shown in Figure
8 as well, male performance in unaffected by the negative emotional stimulus. This
can be demonstrated by the summation of the coefficients on the strongly negative
dummy variable and the new interaction variable. These two coefficients essentially
cancel each other out, illustrating that males’ performance is not altered by the
presence of these negative emotions. Using a Wald test for the summation of these
two coefficients, the hypothesis that the coefficients on the strongly negative dummy
and the interaction of the strongly negative dummy with the gender dummy cancel
each other out cannot be rejected (p=0.9802).
2.5 Discussion
My data confirm that when competing with a person towards which one has
strongly negative emotions, individual performance increases substantially . Specif-
ically, an increase in female performance drives the observed overall performance
increase. This suggests that individuals use the tournament environment as an op-
portunity to retaliate with matched individuals who they previously experienced neg-
atively. Individuals are willing to undertake costly effort in order to increase their
own performance as a means of increasing the probability of a win, suggesting the
presence of negative reciprocity.
One possible explanation for the increase in demonstrated performance may be a
rational response of individuals who expect negatively rated opponents to compete
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more vigorously. Average opponent effort by ratings one through five was 12.23,
11.83, 10.54, 14.9, and 12.92, respectively. There is no difference in the distribu-
tion of opponent performance levels by opponent rating using a Kruskal-Wallis test
(p=0.6507), therefore there does not seem to be evidence that the increase in effort
is driven by a rational response to work harder with a poorly rated individual. Ad-
ditionally, using an ANOVA, we cannot reject that there is no difference in average
opponent performance across opponent ratings (p=0.4715). While the figure of in-
terest is the performance of individuals rated one, both tests show that there is no
evidence that the effort of opponents rated one (strongly negative) is significantly
higher than opponents of any other rating (two through five). Because effort levels
do not differ by opponent rating, this suggests that the emotional channel is driving
the increase in effort.
On the other hand, the increase in performance could be driven by something
unique about subjects willing to rate another individual as strongly negative. While
39% of subjects assigned at least one other participant a “strongly negative” rating,
not all of these subjects were matched with the specific individual assigned the low
rating. Because I observe these subjects across all opponent ratings but do not
observe the increase in performance across all opponent ratings, my results do not
appear due to something special about subjects who give ratings of strongly negative.
Additionally, a test of a correlation between an indicator for whether subjects assigned
at least one strongly negative rating and the subject’s own effort is significant (ρ =
0.155, p=value=0.0385). However, when I restrict this test to only subjects who never
competed with the individual assigned the strongly negative rating, the significance
disappears (ρ = 0.066, p-value=0.4370). If my results were driven by a concern
that there is something unique about individuals willing to assign low ratings, this
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correlation test would have remained significant even for individuals not competing
with the subject with the low rating.
Another possible explanation is that individuals with low profit from the first stage
may increase effort in order to increase the probability of winning the tournament
thus increasing total payoff. There is no difference in average first stage profit between
individuals competing with a strongly negative opponent (rating=1) and those com-
peting with a somewhat negative opponent (rating=2) (p=0.9570). Consequently, if
effort were driven by a concern for profit, one would expect to observe an increase in
effort in both of these two groups. However, as showed above, the increase in effort
was only evident for the individuals competing with a strongly negative opponent.
Therefore, there is no evidence that the increase in effort is driven by a concern for
increasing ones profit, again, providing evidence that emotions are driving the result.
My difference-in-differences estimate is robust to multiple specifications. Including
opponent’s public goods game contribution as a control does little to my difference-
in-differences estimate and it remains significant (0.093), even increasing slightly in
significance. Controlling for opponent’s public goods game contributions allows me
to say that the reported emotions have predictive power over and above parodying for
opponent contribution. Replacing subject contribution with subject first stage profit
and including opponent’s public goods game contribution as a control, again does
little to my difference-in-differences estimate, again, slightly increasing it’s significance
(p=0.087). By including subject’s first stage profit, I can be more sure that income
effects are not driving my results.
Regardless of the behavioral motivation, my results strongly support that the
motivation is largely extrinsic due to the significant increase in performance when
competing with an individual rated strongly negative. Though there may be some
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component of effort that is intrinsic in nature, if the motivation was purely intrinsic
such as if individuals viewed the slider task as fun, I would not expect to observe a
significant difference in behavior among individuals or a significant treatment effect.
Researchers may argue that a four-person public goods game may make it difficult
to establish feelings based on direct intentions. For example, a player may have
contributed zero, but the other group members rate this person positively because
the choice was seen as the smart thing to do. However, given my results and the
correlation between contribution and rating, that possibility does not seem to have
affected my results. Alternatively, the other group members may rate this person
negatively because they are envious of not making the same decision rather than
angry. I cannot differentiate between envious and angry individuals beyond that both
emotions have a negative connotation. Eliciting intensities of specific emotions with
both positive and negative affect would be an interesting extension.
2.6 Conclusion
Competitive environments are found throughout our everyday lives, and are present
in many workplace settings. Examples include “Employee of the Month rewards or a
ranking system that sets a company hierarchy used for determining pay raises. My
experiment examines if and how emotions play a role in competitive exchanges.
My findings indicate that performance increases substantially when an individual
competes with a strongly disliked group member, as the mean performance in the
case of strongly negative reported feelings s higher than all pairings. I have also
shown that women are more responsive to the presence of negative feelings in a
competitive setting. Given that women are generally more averse to competition,
workplace programs that take into account interpersonal relationships may be able
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to counteract this demonstrated aversion towards competition.
Future work on this topic would benefit from determining the true nature of the
generated feelings such as anger, envy, remorse, etc. to help underpin what is truly
driving the increase in performance including whether this increase in arising from
being wronged financially or from observing an individual violate a social norm. It
would also be of interest to determine whether this increase would exist if the violation
of the social norm or financial wronging was realized indirectly. Also, observing a
closing of the gender gap in this unique environment further emphasizes the need for
additional work analyzing other environments that may also close this gap.
I have shown that negative emotions can increase effort in a tournament environ-
ment. Additionally, I have shown that the increase in effort cannot be driven by a
rational increase in effort due to individuals expecting to encounter increased oppo-
nent effort. Also, women increase their work effort in response to negative emotions
and actually embrace the tournament environment suggesting that under the right
circumstances, women an be induced to compete as hard as men.
While it seems intuitive that a positive emotional environment is good for per-
formance, my results in this paper provide an example where the opposite is true:
negative feelings towards co-workers raise performance. Combining this tendency to
respond with increased effort in the presence of negative emotions and the result that
women embrace competition, employers need not worry as much about the potential
for soured relationships outside of the workplace negatively impacting productivity
inside the workplace.
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Chapter 3
Experimental methods: Pay one or
pay all
3.1 Introduction
What distinguishes laboratory experiments in economics from most experiments in
other social sciences is the use of financial incentives. The working assumption is that
providing incentives for choices and outcomes leads to more meaningful and reliable
choice behavior. Specifically, incentives that encourage subjects to make honest and
non-arbitrary choices will accurately reveal characteristics of their preferences.
The simplest and cleanest approach is to have only a single experimental choice.
Cross-task contamination is not an issue with single-choice experiments and there is
no way for subjects to hedge decisions. However, there are also a number of limita-
tions to this approach. While the incentive structure in single-choice experiments is
extremely salient to the subjects, this type of experiment only allows for between-
subject comparisons, requiring a significant amount of observations and relatively
high cost. In addition, it is impossible to study learning or to examine more set-
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tled behavior in relation to equilibrium predictions in an experiment involving some
complexity. Thus, it is common in experiments for participants to make multiple
decisions or one decision for each of a number of periods. This approach is useful for
gathering a considerable amount of incentivized data over the course of a compact
session, allowing the researcher to understand individuals fixed effects and to observe
learning.
The traditional and conservative approach in experiments with multiple decisions
is to pay for the outcome from every decision made (“pay all). An alternative approach
is to pay for only one of the choices made, drawn at random at the end of the session
(“pay one). When using pay one, the amount at stake per choice is multiplied to
compensate for the decreased likelihood of that choices outcome being drawn for
payoff. A related approach to pay one is to pay for a selected number of periods
rather than just one. Doing so helps to even out the earnings made by participants,
which can be useful in terms of subject-pool maintenance. For example, one might
pay for one period of every 10, so that five periods are chosen for payment in a
50-period session.
In terms of current practice, none of the 15 experiments with multiple decisions
reported in the top-five economics journals in 2011 used pay one, and it appears that,
overall, pay one is used less than half as frequently as pay all (Azrieli, Chambers,
and Healy, 2015)[63]. Given this current practice, we consider pay all to be the
baseline approach in this paper. Yet, while it appears that the majority of well-
published multi-period experiments are implementing pay all, some recent research
suggests a theoretical advantage of pay one (Azrieli et al, 2015)[63]. In this paper we
discuss the two approaches, present the challenges and benefits of each, and discuss
how the relative advantage changes depending on the particular laboratory setting.
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Experimenters must weigh a variety of considerations when choosing the incentive
structure of their projects.
Paying for all decisions makes wealth and portfolio effects possible, as well as cross-
task contamination. In experiments where losses are possible, this approach also runs
the risk of having bankruptcy issues distort incentives: If a participant knows that
she has a negative aggregate payoff during a session and knows that losses cannot be
enforced, it is in her interest to take risks in the hope of attaining positive payoffs. In
multi-period experiments where bankruptcy issues are feasible, paying for a period
or periods determined after the experiment ameliorates or eliminates this issue.1
Consider instead a multi-decision experiment where subjects earn money for a
single randomly-selected decision.2 This incentive structure eliminates the opportu-
nity for wealth and portfolio effects and eliminates hedging opportunities (Bardsley,
Cubitt, Loomes, Moffatt, Starmer and Sugden, 2009)[66]. If one holds the expected
payment for a decision the same across pay one and pay all, this means that the
nominal payment will be correspondingly larger (e.g., 10 times as large if one of 10
decisions will be paid).3
Another form of this question is whether paying only a subset of the people (rather
1For example, Charness and Levin (2009)[64] examine the winners curse (in the Acquire-a-
Company task) in 60-period sessions. Bidding positive amounts can generate losses even larger
than the endowment given. To mitigate the bankruptcy issue, smooth the overall individual payoffs
to some extent, and maintain the subjects attention throughout a session, one period from each
10-period range was chosen for actual payoff at the end of the session.
2Cubitt, Starmer, and Sugden (2001)[65] note that if randomization is involved, it is imperative
that subjects understand the process by which this is done. A related potential concern with pay
one is the introduction of background risk, discussed in section 3.
3It is an open empirical question if and when having a smaller-but-certain nominal payoff leads to
more attentiveness than a larger-but-less likely nominal payoff. Anecdotal evidence from Cabrales,
Charness, and Corchn (2003)[67] shows that in a task requiring considerable cognitive resources,
when the nominal payoff was 50, 100, or 150 and each period was paid, some people made arbitrary
responses (i.e., choosing the same color in all 10 periods, despite different circumstances). However,
when the nominal payoff was instead 500, 1000, or 1500 (with only a 10% chance of that period
being selected for payment), no such behavior was observed. This suggests that the higher nominal
payoff is more salient than the reduction in the likelihood of payment for a particular period.
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than choices) in an experiment induces different choice behavior than paying every
participant. Paying only a subset can help with logistical considerations, for example
with online experiments and experiments conducted in large classes, since far fewer
monetary transactions need be made in this case. Can this effort-saving approach
be used without distorting choices compared to those made with a pay-every-person
approach?
In this article we explore the issues involving each of these incentive structures. We
present evidence for and against each incentive option in diverse laboratory settings,
and mention some recent and related ideas. We aim at providing a reference and guide
for experimental economists. We present evidence regarding pay one and pay all in
section 2 and present evidence regarding paying all subjects or a subset in section 3.
We conclude in section 4.
3.2 Pay one or pay all: Evidence
The theoretical literature regarding pay one or pay all in experiments delivers
predictions that depend on assumptions about a specific utility theory and the envi-
ronment. See for example Holt (1986)[68] and Karni and Safra (1987)[69] regarding
risk and expected utility, Chandrasekhar and Xandri (2014)[70] regarding stochastic
termination, and Baillon, Halevy, and Li (2015)[71] who show theoretically that the
order of the randomization and the event is important in ambiguity experiments. In a
recent paper, Azrieli et al. (2015)[63] conclude that in a rather general environments
that include strategic choices paying for only one period (and in fact, not having a
show-up fee paid) is the best mechanism.
The general conclusion from this theoretical literature is that the benchmark pre-
diction is sensitive to the assumptions made. Hence, for theoretically-motivated ex-
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periments, the incentive structure should be part of the benchmark prediction of
the model, and the equivalence between the two payments should not be assumed.
However, the focus of this paper is not on the theoretical aspect of the comparison
between pay all and pay one, but rather on practical considerations in the laboratory.
We now proceed to empirical evidence regarding each incentive structure, specifying
the laboratory setting.
Table 1 summarizes the results of each study discussed.
Author(s) Experimental
Task
Summary of Results
Andersen et al.
(2014)[72]
Discounting task The effect of paying only a subset of
subjects by exogenously varying the
probability of payment from 10% to 100%.
Do not find an effect on subject behavior.
Baltussen, Post,
van den Assem
and Wakker
(2012)[73]
Deal or No Deal
(dynamic setting)
Risk preferences were consistent on average
across the pay one and single-choice
treatments. However, in the treatment
where only 10% of subjects were selected at
random for payment, observe a significant
decrease in risk aversion.
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Bardsley, Cubitt,
Loomes, Moffatt,
Starmer
andSugden
(2009)[66]
Book Chapter
about incentive
mechanisms
Indicate that the pay one incentive
structure eliminated the opportunity for
wealth and portfolio effects and eliminates
hedging opportunities. They find little
evidence of bias when using the random
lottery incentive scheme, and conclude there
is more support than opposition for this
payment scheme.
Beaud and
Willinger
(2015)[74]
Risk elicitation Observe no difference in risk vulnerability
whether only 10% of subjects are selected at
random for payment or all subjects are paid.
Blanco,
Englemann, Koch
and Normann
(2010)[75]
Cooperation
game with belief
elicitation
Do not find evidence of hedging when
paying for both the game outcome and the
belief elicitation. Additionally, stated beliefs
did not differ whether subjects were paid for
both the game outcome and the belief
elicitation or one selected at random.
Bolle (1990)[76] Social
Preferences
No difference in behavior across the
treatment where subjects are paid for all
decisions (pay all) and the treatment where
two out of twenty subjects are randomly
selected for payment.
Brokesova, Deck,
and Peliova
(2015)[77]
Risk elicitation Observe no difference in behavior on a
risk-taking task between a single choice, a
task selected at random for payment, and a
subject selected at random for payment.
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Casari, Ham and
Kagel (2007)[78]
First price
sealed-bid
common value
auctions
Inexperienced bidders with larger cash
balances bid somewhat less aggressively
than those with smaller balances. Argue
that the effect on behavior is not
economically significant but they find even
less influence on behavior with experienced
bidders.
Clot, Grolleau
and Ibanez
(2015)[79]
Social
Preferences
Find no difference in behavior when all
participants are paid versus when only some
participants are paid.
Cox (2009)[80] Social
Preferences
Stronger social context (repeated interaction
with pay one) resulted in more generous
behavior by dictators, second movers in the
investment game but not first movers in the
investment game than with weak social
context (single-choice).
Cox, Sadiraj, and
Sadiraj (2008)[81]
Social
Preferences
Conduct a test of trust, fear, and
reciprocity, with both a single-choice
treatment and a pay one treatment and do
not observe differences in subject behavior
across treatments.
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Cox, Sadiraj and
Schmidt
(2014)[82]
Lottery Choice Subjects choose the safe option more
frequently when listed next to an
asymmetrically dominated alternative than
when presented in isolation, resulting in a
preference reversal that creates concern
about using pay one.
Cox, Sadiraj and
Schmidt
(2015)[83]
Lottery Choice Test eight different incentive mechanisms
and observe large differences in revealed risk
preferences across the eight options.
Cubitt, Starmer
and Sugden
(1998)[84]
Lottery Choice Find no evidence of a contamination effect
and cannot reject the independence axiom
therefore behavior appears unbiased with
pay one. Additionally, there is no evidence
that behavior under the pay one incentive
structure is less risk averse.
Erat and Gneezy
(2012)[85]
Deception game Some people prefer not to lie even when
lying increases theirs and the receiver’s
payoff. One out of twenty subjects were
paid.
Garvin and Kagel
(1994)[86]
First price
sealed-bid
common value
auctions
Find that the coefficient on the cash balance
to be statistically significant and negative,
indicating evidence that paying all can have
a significant effect on subject bidding
behavior.
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Ham, Kagel and
Lehrer (2005)[87]
First price
sealed-bid private
value auctions
Accumulated cash balances significantly
affect behavior and subjects seem to have
income targets. Subjects bid high initially
to try and win the auction but as cash
balances rise and subjects approach what
appears to be an income target, bids fall.
This suggests that here pay all may have a
problematic effect on behavior.
Harrison et al.
(2007)[88]
MPL Do not observe a difference in subject
behavior when paying only 10% of the
subjects versus paying all subjects.
Harrison,
Martinez-Correa
and Swarthout
(2013)[89]
Lottery Choice Facing multiple lottery choices and pay one,
subjects’ choices show a significant shift
towards risk-neutral behavior, in line with
Expected Utility Theory.
Harrison and
Swarthout
(2014)[90]
Lottery Choice When implementing pay one, compared to a
single-choice experimental design, there is
no difference in behavior under the
assumption of Expected Utility Theory.
Laury (2006)[91] MPL Finds risk aversion to be highest under high
stakes but does not observe a difference in
behavior when comparing pay all and pay
one under low stakes, therefore, concludes
that pay one is not causing subjects to scale
down incentives to account for the random
selection.
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Lee (2008)[92] Change
improving
decision model
The introduction of background risk due to
the pay one incentive structure makes
subjects behave more risk aversely.
However, pay one controls for possible
wealth effects compared to pay all, and the
authors find evidence that pay one is better
under repetition in individual decision
making experiments.
List, Haigh and
Nerlove
(2005)[93]
Lottery Choice Using both students and experienced
traders, show that while students’ choices
do not reflect evidence of the reduction of
compound lotteries principle, the choices of
the professional traders do.
Loomes, Starmer
and Sugden
(1991)[94]
Lottery Choice Subjects preferences exhibit cyclical
patterns and the direction of the patterns is
consistent with regret theory and a violation
of transitivity, therefore the cycles are not
due to an issue with pay one.
Schmidt and
Hewig (2015)[95]
Lottery Choice Using a within-subjects design, show that
subjects make more risky decisions with pay
all than with pay one.
Sefton (1992)[96] Social
Preferences
When the probability of payment for each
subject is only 25% because only two out of
eight pairs are paid, dictator behavior is
more generous than when all subjects are
paid.
72
Sherstyuk, Tarui
and Saijo
(2013)[97]
Infinite-horizon
Prisoners
dilemma game
Find that pay one causes players to discount
the future more heavily than pay all.
Additionally, subjects are more myopic and
time inconsistent under pay one.
Cooperation rates do not differ whether
paying for the last round or all rounds but
are significantly lower when paying for one
round randomly. Subjects use the “Always
Defect strategy significantly more under pay
one than under paying for only the last
round or paying for all rounds. More
subjects use the “Tit-for-Tat and
“Trigger-with-Reversion strategies under
paying for only the last round or paying for
all rounds.
Smeets et al.
(2015)[98]
Social
Preferences
People with over one million Euro in their
bank account play dictator game for $100.
One out of ten subjects is paid.
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Stahl and Haruvy
(2006)[99]
Social
Preferences
Pay one misrepresents behavior as
egalitarian in the form of “path-dependent
egalitarian warm glow. Because subjects
choices are only implemented with small
probabilities, the cost of an egalitarian
option is very low but the benefits of warm
glow are felt regardless of the implemented
choice. Larger group sizes can minimize
other-regarding preferences.
Starmer and
Sugden
(1991)[100]
Lottery Choice Compare behavior of subjects facing two
pairs of lotteries with one randomly selected
for payment and subjects facing a single
choice. Behavior is consistent across
treatments thus there is no evidence that
subjects reduce compound lotteries,
suggesting that pay one was not
problematic.
3.2.1 Binary-choice lotteries
In the binary-choice lottery paradigm, participants face pairs of lotteries and in each
pair they select which lottery they would like to play, and a randomization device then
determines the result of the chosen lottery. If a researcher chooses pay all, subjects observe
the outcome of each selected lottery and are then paid for each realized outcome. With
pay one, though the subjects have submitted decisions for many pairs of lotteries, they
are only paid for the outcome of the lottery pair that has been selected randomly. Note
that binary-choice-lottery experimental designs already include risk and choosing pay one
74
introduces an additional layer of risk.
Figure 3.1: Holt and Laury (2002) mechanism
Consider a binary-choice-lottery experimental design where subjects face two decisions.
Perhaps the most well-known example is the risk-elicitation multiple price list mechanism
used in Holt and Laury (2002; see Figure 1)[101]. This involves an array of 10 decision tasks
presented in rows and featuring a higher-variance option (risky) and a lower-variance option
(safe). The higher-variance option becomes more and more attractive as one descends down
the rows, until choosing this option in the bottom row is the dominant strategy. Participants
make a choice in each of the 10 rows; one is chosen at random for actual payoff.
The likelihood of the high (low) payoff increases (decreases) as one moves down the
Table, so that Option B is increasingly attractive in lower and lower rows; a risk-neutral
person will choose Option A in the top four rows and Option B in the bottom six rows. The
row in which one switches from choosing Option A to choosing Option B depends on ones
risk preferences. In the original study, one row was selected randomly, with the decision
made for that row implemented.
Evidence that pay one and pay all lead to similar results
Laury (2006)[91] addresses the concern of diluted incentives with pay one in a multiple-
price-list experiment on risk preferences, with the same format as Holt and Laury (2002)[101].
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In one treatment she pays one of the ten choices at low stakes, while in another all ten choices
are paid at low stakes. A third treatment is pay one at high stakes. Laury (2006)[91] finds
risk aversion to be highest under high stakes but does not observe a difference in behavior
when comparing pay all and pay one under low stakes. Because subjects behave the same
in these treatments, there does not appear to be evidence that subjects are scaling down
the incentives to account for the random selection.
Starmer and Sugden (1991)[100] present subjects with two pairs of lotteries with one pair
randomly chosen for payment, comparing behavior in a single-choice treatment and a pay-
one treatment in order to test for whether people reduce compound lotteries to simple ones,
as prescribed by expected utility. The authors find evidence supporting the usefulness of
pay one. Additionally, Cubitt et al. (1998)[84] find no evidence of cross-task contamination
with pay one and no evidence that subjects choices in pay one exhibit less risk aversion
than in the single-choice treatment.
Harrison and Swarthout (2014)[90] show that when implementing pay one, compared
to a single-choice experimental design, there is no difference in behavior under the assump-
tion of Expected Utility Theory (EUT). Indeed, Harrison, Martinez-Correa, and Swarthout
(2013)[89] find that even when faced with multiple pairs of lotteries in pay one, subjects
choices show a significant shift towards risk-neutral behavior from more risk-averse be-
havior. In contrast, Schmidt and Hewig (2015)[95] show that subjects make more risky
decisions with pay all than with pay one, using a within-subjects design. Since expressed
risk preferences differ in the two treatments, this creates concern about using pay one.
However, within-subject designs and between-subjects designs may lead to different results;
see Charness, Gneezy, and Imas (2013)[102] for more discussion.4
In experiments using the binary-choice lottery design where subjects face at least 20
4Charness, Gneezy, and Imas (2013)[102] consider the advantages and disadvantages of each type
of design. A main point is that within-subject designs may lead to spurious correlations and that
between-subjects designs seem more conservative. While between-subject designs lack the statistical
power of within-subject designs, significant effects found with this method are more reliably present
(Type I error versus Type II error).
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pairs of lotteries, one can observe cycles in subjects choices. Loomes, Starmer, and Sugden
(1991)[94] investigate if these cycles are the result of a problem with pay one, finding that
the direction of the cycles is consistent with regret theory and that they cannot be due to
random error. Additionally, they determine that the cycles are the result of a violation of
transitivity, rather than reflecting any issue with pay one.
List, Haigh, and Nerlove (2005)[93] use an Allais-paradox experiment to test whether
the independence axiom is violated in a study with professional traders from the Chicago
Board of Trade. The traders choices do not offer evidence of difficulties with compound
lotteries, so that pay one does not seem problematic in this case. Brokesova, Deck, and
Peliova (2015)[77] compare behavior on a risk-taking task where it is either the only task
and payment is assured, where it is one of several similar tasks of which one will be randomly
selected for payment, and whether it is the only task but there is only a small probability
of receiving payment. They find no difference in risk-taking behavior when subjects decide
between a risky payment and a safe payment across single-choice and pay-one treatments.
Evidence that pay one and pay all lead to different results
There are also studies that show differences in behavior across payment approaches.
Cox, Sadiraj, and Schmidt (2014)[82] presented subjects with pairs of lotteries that include
asymmetrically-dominated alternatives: An alternative that is inferior in all respects to one
option; but, in comparison to the other option, it is inferior in some respects and superior
in others (Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982)[103]. The authors find that subjects choose the
safe option more frequently when listed next to an asymmetrically dominated alternative
than when presented in isolation. The preference reversal calls into question the usefulness
of pay one in experiments with this design feature. In addition, Cox, Sadiraj, and Schmidt
(2015)[83] run a thorough and exhaustive test of eight different incentive structures and
find large differences in revealed risk preferences across the eight options.
The List, Haigh, and Nerlove (2005)[93] study referenced above also has a treatment
involving undergraduate students. In contrast to the results with professional traders, the
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students do appear to have some difficulty with compound lotteries, creating concern about
using pay one.
Nevertheless, our sense is that the overall empirical evidence supports the usefulness of
pay one approach in the preponderance of lottery choice experiments, but that concerns arise
when the environment deviates from the simple pairwise lottery selection into more complex
decisions or when subjects are less sophisticated in terms of complexity and compound
lotteries.
3.2.2 Social preferences
Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj (2008)[81] conducted a test of trust, fear, and reciprocity
using both triadic and dyadic designs. Subjects participated in either a single-choice treat-
ment or a pay-one treatment, and there was no difference in subject behavior across the
two treatments. In this specific social-preference environment, pay one and single-choice
approaches produce similar results.
Stahl and Haruvy (2006)[99] find that pay one distorts behavior in dictator games of
varying group sizes, where subjects know the selected dictator prior to making allocation
choices, leading them to state “Selecting one decision out of many to determine monetary
payoffs can drastically reduce the importance of terminal payoffs relative to path-dependent
effects. Clearly, when the dictator is announced after subjects have made their choices and
the group size is larger, the probability of ones choice being implemented for actual payment
is small. In that situation, subjects appear to behave more pro-socially.
Cox (2009)[80] uses game triads to investigate differences in behavior across social con-
texts. He finds significant changes in behavior given the strong social context generated by
repeated interaction and pay one compared to a single-choice weak social context.
On balance, we do not have a clear recommendation regarding using pay one in social-
preference experiments. We find that there is reason for caution, but that there is also evi-
dence that using pay one may be relatively innocuous. Whether the experimenter chooses
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to implement pay one or pay all in this environment may come down to logistical consid-
erations. For example, Charness and Rabin (2002)[54] considered a large number of simple
experimental games and decision tasks in a pen-and-paper experiment. To amass a suffi-
cient number of observations for each game or task, it was necessary to have subjects make
choices in a number of different tasks. The authors chose to pay for one of four (or two
of eight) decisions, randomly-drawn to ease the process of calculating payoffs and making
payments in real time.5
3.2.3 Belief elicitation
Another issue involves incentivizing belief elicitation, an important issue for belief-based
models of behavior. Concerns can arise when paying for both the game outcome as well
as the incentivized belief elicitation. Subjects may find an opportunity to hedge by, for
example, betting against their success in the task. One alternative is to pay only for action
choices or beliefs, with the choice of which of these two made randomly. Another is to
simply not incentivize beliefs. A third option is to make the payoffs from beliefs relatively
small; this approach can substantially reduce incentives to hedge, although of course these
are not completely eliminated. A fourth option (used by Armentier and Treich, 2009[104],
and Danz, Fehr, and Ku¨bler, 2012[105]) is to pay a subject for a stated belief based on the
choice of a subject other than the one with whom she is paired.
Blanco, Engelmann, Koch, and Normann (2010)[75] conduct experiments with the Pris-
oners Dilemma and a coordination game, testing whether behavior differs when people are
paid for each task or for only one task drawn at random. They find no difference in stated
beliefs or choices in the Prisoners Dilemma, when beliefs are measured using the quadratic-
scoring rule. However, they do find a difference in the coordination game using a linear
belief-elicitation mechanism. They argue that hedging possibilities are more transparent
5An additional issue was that the payoffs in each task might have seemed miniscule if subjects
were paid for each task. The evidence from Cabrales, Charness, and Corchn (2003)[67] mentioned
earlier also influenced the choice.
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in their latter case. Overall, their conclusion is that “Hedging can indeed be a problem in
belief-elicitation experiments. However at least according to our results, this seems to be
the case only if incentives to hedge are strong and prominent.
So what should an experimenter do when faced with the necessity of eliciting beliefs in
a multi-round experiment? The first approach of simply not incentivizing beliefs may be
unsatisfactory. Erev, Bornstein, and Wallsten (1993)[106] find differences in behavior across
incentivized and non-incentivized beliefs in a public-goods game and Croson (2000)[107]
also finds differences in a Prisoners Dilemma. On the other hand, Nyarko & Schotter
(2002)[108], Rutstrm and Wilcox (2009)[109] and Ga¨chter and Renner (2010)[110] do not
find evidence of differences in behavior according to whether or not beliefs are incentivized.
In any case, we are reluctant to recommend not incentivizing beliefs when this is feasible,
given that incentivization has long been considered a strong suit of experimental economics.
Regarding paying for either actions or beliefs (but not both), the Blanco et al. (2010)[75]
results suggest that this may not be necessary if hedging opportunities are not obvious.
Overall, we favor one of the other two approaches, although we feel that these do need
more study. Paying for beliefs about another persons action may not always be feasible, but
seems attractive when it can be implemented without confusing the subjects. Alternatively,
one could simply make the belief payoffs small relative to the choice payoffs, thereby greatly
reducing the scope for hedging. In this case, we do not recommend paying only for either
beliefs or choices drawn randomly.
3.2.4 Auctions
In both first-price sealed-bid private-value auctions (each potential bidder has a separate
draw from the range of possible values) and common-value auctions (the value is the same
for all bidders), the accumulation of cash balances from earnings significantly affects bidding
behavior including evidence of income targeting (Garvin & Kagel, 1994[86]; Ham, Kagel,
and Lehrer, 2005[87]; Casari, Ham, and Kagel, 2007[78]). In the beginning, subjects appear
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to bid high in order to win the auction, but as their cash balance grows, bidding falls
as they reach their income target (Ham et al., 2005)[87]. This trend in bidding behavior
appears more prevalent in inexperienced bidders and diminishes as bidders gain experience
in additional sessions (Casari et al., 2007)[78].
Some argue that this issue can be addressed with econometric techniques. For example,
in a first-price sealed-bid private value auction, cash balances are endogenous and because
only the winners cash balance adjusts each period, there is little variation in cash balances.
Ham et al. (2005)[87] tackle the endogeneity problem in two ways: By adjusting the exper-
imental design to allow for exogenous variation in cash balances, and by using instrumental
variables in their estimation of the cash-balance effect based on the new exogenous variation
in cash balances, including cash balances as an explanatory variable. Still, after correcting
for endogeneity, they find significant evidence of cash balances affecting bidding behavior,
as mentioned above.
Overall, our sense is that the concerns about cash-balance accumulation and bankruptcy
with pay all support using pay one in auction settings.
3.2.5 Dynamic-choice and Infinite-horizon settings
Comparing behavior in a pay-one treatment and a single-choice treatment in a dynamic-
choice setting (“Deal or No Deal), Baltussen, Post, van den Assem, and Wakker (2012)[73]
find, on average, that risk preferences were consistent across the single-choice and pay-one
treatments. This result supports the approach of paying each subject for one of her 10
decisions in dynamic-choice experiments, allowing the researcher to obtain more data and
make within-subject comparisons.
Sherstyuk, Tarui, and Saijo (2013)[97] assess behavior in an infinite-horizon prisoners-
dilemma game; the infinite horizon is implemented using a stochastic termination rule.
Paying subjects for a randomly-selected round as opposed to all rounds resulted in lower
cooperation rates, more myopic behavior, and a present period bias. Subjects showed a
81
higher probability of adopting the “Always Defect strategy rather than the “Tit-For-Tat
as found with pay all. While paying all subjects in an infinitely-repeated game can get
costly, especially when the incentives must be large enough to ensure subject motivation,
it appears that pay one changes behavior relative to pay all.
Sherstyuk et al. (2013)[97] also investigate if paying for only the last round might provide
similar results to paying for all rounds in the infinite-horizon environment. The authors
find the same cooperation rates and the same strategy profiles in these two treatments.
Since paying for only the last round avoids wealth and portfolio effects, this approach (with
infinite-horizon environments) seems useful; Chandrasekhar and Xandri (2014)[70] develop
theory indicating that this is the best approach.
3.3 Paying only a subset of the participants: Evi-
dence
In some experiments, such as classroom or online, paying only a subset of the partic-
ipants is desirable from a logistics perspective. Paying only one out of many participants
combines the issues discussed above in relation to making the actual pay for a given action
probabilistic. In addition, there is potentially a fundamental psychological difference be-
tween being definitely paid a positive amount and only having a chance to receive payment,
suggesting caution concerned paying a random subset of the experimental subjects.
In general, the results in the literature are encouraging because they show little difference
between the two methods. In an early experiment comparing the pay-all to the pay-subset
mechanism, Bolle (1990)[76] conducted an ultimatum game experiment comparing the pay-
all treatment to a treatment in which only two out of twenty subjects were paid. There was
no significant difference in behavior between the treatments.
Sefton (1992)[96] tested the effect of paying all participants versus paying 2 out of 8
pairs in a $5 dictator game. He reports that participants are more generous when only one
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in four is paid. Note that the dictator game is particularly sensitive to the actual amount
of payment (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton, 1994[111]) compared for example with
payments in the ultimatum game (Slonim and Roth, 1998[112]; Andersen, Ertac, Gneezy,
Hoffman, and List, 2011[113]). In contrast with Sefton (1992)[96], Clot, Grolleau and Ibanez
(2015)[79] compare the results of a dictator game treatment in which all participants were
paid with one in which only a subset was paid, and report no significant difference between
the treatments.
Beaud and Willinger (2015)[74] conduct risk-elicitation experiments, using an adapta-
tion of the Gneezy and Potters (1997)[8] risk-elicitation method, while varying different
aspects of methodology. In Experiment 1, participants could earn up to 250 Euro, but only
10% of the participants were randomly selected at the end of the experiment to actually
be paid. In Experiment 2, all participants were paid according to their earnings in the
experiment, but stakes were much lower than in experiment 1 (the maximum was 50 Euro).
The main finding is that there is no difference in risk vulnerability (reflecting sensitivity to
background risk) across these two designs.6 This was true despite of the fact that many
other features were varied across these treatments.7 Brokesova et al. (2015)[77] tested how
a small probability of receiving payment affected subjects risk-taking behavior compared to
a single-choice treatment. In the experiment, subjects faced a choice between a safe and a
risky payment that mirrored the structure of a local bank promotion. Again, they find no
difference in subjects choices.
Harrison, Lau, and Rutstrm (2007)[88] tested the effect of increasing the payoffs in the
6A related potential concern with pay one is the introduction of background risk, described as
any risk that is committed but unresolved (see also Lee, 2008)[92]. A randomization device that
determines subjects payments after all decisions are made and is not resolved before subjects make
their decisions introduces this issue. If the introduction of such background risk alters subjects
behavior, pay one is a less attractive approach.
7Experiment 1 was a pen-and-paper experiment, while Experiment 2 was computerized. Partic-
ipants in Experiment 1 were first-year masters students in economics, while participants in Experi-
ment 2 were selected from a subject pool from various disciplines. Finally participants in Experiment
1 received an endowment from the experimenter, while participants in Experiment 2 had to work in
a preliminary task to earn a monetary endowment.
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Holt and Laury (2002)[101] design discussed above, using payoffs that are roughly 150 times
the base payoffs in Holt and Laury (2002)[101], but paid only 10% of their participants.
They report an additional experiment that directly examine the hypothesis that paying
only a subset of the participants generates the same responses as paying all of them the
large amount. Harrison et al (2007)[88] report that they could not reject the null hypothesis
that paying all the participants and paying only 10% of them results in the same behavior.
Similarly, Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstrm (2014)[72] explicitly tested the effect of
paying only a subset of the participants by exogenously varying the probability of payment
for their discounting task from 10% to 100%. They conclude: “the effect of probabilistic
discounting is non-existent or negligible in our sample, and for the specifications considered
here.
Baltussen et al. (2012)[73] is an exception to the above, demonstrating concerns about
paying a random subject, particularly in a complex and dynamic environment. They use
the game show “Deal or No Deal to test this type of dynamic-choice environment. In the
experimental design, they used a baseline treatment where subjects played the game once for
payment. As discussed earlier, one treatment of interest included subjects playing 10 rounds
with one of these rounds randomly selected for payment. In another treatment subjects
played a single round and 10% of subjects were randomly selected to receive payment.8
While the paying-a-random-subject treatment and baseline treatment avoid any cross-task
contamination concerns, the authors observe a significant decrease in risk aversion in the
random-subject treatment.
Overall, the majority of comparisons of paying all the participants versus only a subset
of them indicate that the loss of motivation is smallmuch smaller than the implied reduction
in actual payment.
An important issue relates to moral choices in cases where pay only one out of N
participants is used. In many experiments, the decision made by the participant includes
8The face value of prizes was held constant across treatments (guaranteed payment, random
round, and random subject).
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some moral value. In such situations, participants may care about signaling to others that
they are moral people. They might also be concerned about identity, and hence would use
their choices to self-signal how moral they are. In situations where signaling is important,
paying only some of the participants may be problematic because the moral act is chosen
with certainty, while the material payoff is paid only in a fraction of the cases. This problem
could affect moral and immoral choices.
Consider for example Smeets, Bauer, and Gneezy (2015)[98], who conduct a dictator
game with people that have more than one million Euro in a bank account. These par-
ticipants receive 100 Euro, and are asked whether they wish to give some of this money
to another participant. However, only one out of ten participants is paid according to the
decision he/she made. If a participant decides to send a large sum of money, say the entire
100 Euro, then he/she can feel good about the action, and gain the value of positive signal-
ing. The positive signaling value from sending 100 Euro could be large. Yet, the expected
cost of this decision is only 10 Euros, because only one out of ten participants is being paid.
For an early example of studying this issue, see Stahl and Haruvy (2006)[99].
A similar case, but with a negative action, relates to lying. Participants in Erat and
Gneezy (2012)[85] play a deception game in which one party sends a message advising
the second party about which action pays the receiver the most. If the advice given is
followed, in most cases lying increases the payoff of the sender but decreases the payoff of
the receiver, while in some cases lying increases the payoffs for both the sender and receiver.
In the experiment, only one out of twenty senders was paid, and the conclusion was that
some people prefer not to lie even when lying increases theirs and the receivers payoff.
However, as in the dictator game, this conclusion might be inflated because a sender who
chooses to lie is a liarregardless of whether he or she subsequently receives payment. The
signaling value is certain, while the monetary payoff is not.
Future research could investigate whether this difference between the signal value and
its cost is indeed larger when only some of the participants are actually paid. If it is, then
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the conclusion drawn from these studies is inflated in the direction of considering people to
be moral. If the difference is not important, then this is a very efficient way of collecting
data.
3.4 Conclusion
Experimental research in economics differs from many disciplines in that researchers
generally incentivize subjects decisions. When selecting an incentive structure, researchers
need to assess various characteristics including risk of cross-task contamination, bankruptcy,
income effects, and data analysis concerns. While designing an experiment around a sin-
gle choice is the cleanest approach, such experiments can be expensive and only allow for
between-subject data analyses. Gathering data from multiple periods is considerably more
efficient than a single-choice design. In addition, more complex decisions may require mul-
tiple periods to ensure comprehension.
Yet having subjects complete multiple decisions and paying for each one comes with
its own set of issues including the potential for wealth and portfolio effects, cross-task
contamination, hedging opportunities, and bankruptcy issues. One alternative approach
that we find is generally useful is to have subjects make multiple decisions and pay for a
randomly-selected one. But using pay one raises its own concerns: while this eliminates
problems associated with wealth and portfolio effects or bankruptcy, there is the potential
for diluted incentives and the introduction of background risk. Another technique, which
minimizes transactions costs, is to be pay only a subset of the participants. The evidence
we have presented suggests that that there may not be a substantial loss of motivation when
this device is used.
Table 2 summarizes our recommendations in the different types of experiments that we
have discussed.
Environment Recommendation
86
Lottery
Choice/Multiple
Price Lists
Empirical evidence supports the usefulness pay one in the
great majority of lottery choice experiments but concerns
arise when the environment deviates from the simple pairwise
lottery selection into more complex decisions.
Social
Preferences
Because social preferences span such a variety of environments
and the evidence is mixed, we do not make a strong
recommendation. It is not clear that pay one leads to different
results, so in principle either approach could be employed.
Logistical issues may affect the decision to use pay one or pay
all.
Belief Elicitation If hedging opportunities are not obvious, pay one is a useful
method. A more cautious approach is to pay for both the
game outcome and the belief elicitation but to make the belief
payoffs small relative to the choice payoffs, thereby greatly
reducing the scope for hedging.
Auctions The concerns about cash balance accumulation and
bankruptcy with a pay all incentive structure support pay one
over pay all in auction settings.
Background Risk Pay one is not problematic if the background risk is resolved
prior to the subject making any decisions. For example,
handing the subject a sealed envelope containing the
randomly-selected round for payment.
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Dynamic Settings Only one study of which we are aware. Pay one and pay all
lead to similar behavior in a “Deal or No Deal setting and so
we endorse pay one here. However, paying only 10% of
subjects led to a significant decrease in risk aversion, so we do
not recommend this approach in this setting. More research is
needed.
Infinite Horizon Only one study of which we are aware. Shown both
theoretically and empirically in infinite-horizon settings with
random termination, subject behavior is consistent whether
paying for all rounds or when paying for the last round. More
research is needed.
We have detailed existing evidence for and against each incentive structure, providing
examples of experiments comparing subjects behavior under different incentive structures.
In general, while in some cases the pay-one (and pay-a-subset) method may distort behavior,
the data suggest that in the majority of cases it is either equal to (or sometimes superior
to) the pay-all method. In general, we feel that both pay one and pay all are useful
methods, although there are instances (such as when bankruptcy is possible) where practical
considerations suggest using pay one (as is indicated by the theoretical work of Azrieli et al.,
2015). We hope to further the discussion about how to best choose an incentive structure
when designing an experiment.
3.5 Permissions and Attributions
1. The content of chapter 3 is the result of a collaboration with Gary Charness and
Uri Gneezy, and has previously appeared in the Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, Volume 131, pages 141-150. It is reproduced here with the permission
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of Elsevier.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1.1 Math Task Treatment Instructions
WELCOME
In the experiment today you will be asked to complete four different tasks. None
of these will take more than 5 minutes. At the end of the experiment we will randomly
select one of the tasks and pay you based on your performance in that task. Once
you have completed the four tasks we determine which task counts for payment by
drawing a number between 1 and 4. The method we use to determine your earnings
varies across tasks. Before each task we will describe in detail how your payment is
determined.
Your total earnings from the experiment are the sum of your payment for the
randomly selected task and a $5 show up fee. At the end of the experiment you will
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be paid in private.
TASK 1 Piece Rate
For Task 1 you will be asked to calculate the sum of five randomly chosen two-
digit numbers. You will be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series of
these problems. You cannot use a calculator to determine this sum, however you are
welcome to write the numbers down and make use of the provided scratch paper. You
submit an answer by clicking the submit button with your mouse. When you enter
an answer the computer will immediately tell you whether your answer is correct or
not. Your answers to the problems are anonymous.
If Task 1 is the one randomly selected for payment, then you get 50 cents per
problem you solve correctly in the 5 minutes allotted for this task. Your payment
does not decrease if you provide an incorrect answer to a problem. We refer to this
payment as the piece rate payment.
Please do not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment. If you
have any questions, please raise your hand.
TASK 2 - Tournament
As in Task 1 you will be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a se-
ries of five 2-digit numbers. However for this task your payment depends on your
performance relative to that of a group of other participants. Each group consists of
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four people, the three other members of your group are located in the same row as you.
If Task 2 is the one randomly selected for payment, then your earnings depend on
the number of problems you solve compared to the three other people in your group.
The individual who correctly solves the largest number of problems will receive $2
per correct problem, while the other participants receive no payment. We refer to
this as the tournament payment. You will not be informed of how you did in the
tournament until the end of the experiment. If there are ties the winner will be ran-
domly determined.
Please do not talk with one another. If you have any questions, please raise your
hand.
TASK 3 - Choice
As in the previous two tasks you will be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct
sum of a series of five 2-digit numbers. However you will now get to choose which of
the two previous payment schemes you prefer to apply to your performance on the
third task.
If Task 3 is the one randomly selected for payment, then your earnings for this
task are determined as follows.
If you choose the piece rate you receive 50 cents per problem you solve correctly.
If you choose the tournament your performance will be evaluated relative to the per-
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formance of the other three participants of your group in the previous task (Task
2-tournament). The Task 2-tournament is the one you just completed. If you cor-
rectly solve more problems than they did in Task 2, then you receive four times the
payment from the piece rate, which is $2 per correct problem. You will receive no
earnings for this task if you choose the tournament and do not solve more problems
correctly now, than the others in your group did in the Task-2 tournament. You will
not be informed of how you did in the tournament until the end of the experiment.
If there are ties the winner will be randomly determined.
Please choose whether you want the piece rate or the tournament applied to your
performance. You will then be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series
of five randomly chosen two-digit numbers.
Please do not talk with one another. If you have any questions, please raise your
hand.
TASK 4 Submit Piece Rate
You do not have to add any numbers for the fourth task of the experiment. In-
stead, your score from Task 1 - Piece Rate will be used according to your choice for
payment. You can either choose to be paid according to the piece rate, or according
to the tournament.
If the fourth task is the one selected for payment, then your earnings for this
task are determined as follows. If you choose the piece rate you receive 50 cents per
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problem you solved in Task 1.
If you choose the tournament your performance will be evaluated relative to the
performance of the other three participants of your group in the Task 1-piece rate.
If you correctly solved more problems in Task 1 than they did then you receive four
times the earnings of the piece rate, which is equivalent to $2 per correct problem.
You will receive no earnings for this task if you choose the tournament and did not
solve more problems correctly in Task 1 than the other members of your group.
Above, we remind you how many problems you correctly solved in Task 1. Please
choose whether you want the piece rate or the tournament applied to your perfor-
mance.
Please do not talk with one another. If you have any questions, please raise your
hand.
A.1.2 Facial Emotion Task Treatment Instructions
WELCOME
In the experiment today you will be asked to complete four different tasks. None
of these will take more than 5 minutes. At the end of the experiment we will randomly
select one of the tasks and pay you based on your performance in that task. Once
you have completed the four tasks we determine which task counts for payment by
drawing a number between 1 and 4. The method we use to determine your earnings
94
varies across tasks. Before each task we will describe in detail how your payment is
determined.
Your total earnings from the experiment are the sum of your payment for the
randomly selected task and a $5 show up fee. At the end of the experiment you will
be paid in private.
TASK 1 Piece Rate
For Task 1 you will be shown 15 photographs depicting individual’s faces. For
each image, you will be asked to identify the emotion depicted on the individual’s
face. The emotions in the images have been professionally classified by psychologists
doing research in this field. The images will be projected on your computer screen for
a very short period of time (2 seconds). After the image is shown, you will be given
four options from which to select the correctly displayed emotion. You will have 20
seconds to submit your answer. You submit an answer by clicking the submit button
with your mouse. When you enter an answer the computer will immediately tell you
whether your answer is correct or not. Your answers to the problems are anonymous.
While you will never see the same image twice, the same emotion may be repeated.
If Task 1 is the one randomly selected for payment, then you get 50 cents per
emotion you correctly identify in Task 1. Your payment does not decrease if you
provide an incorrect answer to an image. We refer to this payment as the piece rate
payment.
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Please do not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment. If you
have any questions, please raise your hand.
TASK 2 Tournament
As in Task 1 you will be shown 15 photographs of individual’s faces. You will
again be trying to correctly identify the emotions depicted on the faces. For this
task your payment depends on your performance relative to that of a group of other
participants. Each group consists of four people. The three other members of your
group are located in the same row as you.
If Task 2 is the one randomly selected for payment, then your earnings depend on
the number of emotions you correctly identify compared to the three other people in
your group. The individual who correctly identifies the largest number of emotions
will receive $2 per correct emotion, while the other participants receive no payment.
We refer to this as the tournament payment. You will not be informed of how you
did in the tournament until the end of the experiment. If there are ties the winner
will be randomly determined.
Please do not talk with one another. If you have any questions, please raise your
hand.
TASK 3 Choice
As in the previous two tasks, you will again be shown 15 photographs of individ-
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ual’s faces and asked to identify the depicted emotions. However you will now get
to choose which of the two previous payment schemes you prefer to apply to your
performance on the third task.
If Task 3 is the one randomly selected for payment, then your earnings for this
task are determined as follows.
If you choose the piece rate you receive 50 cents per correctly identified emo-
tion. If you choose the tournament your performance will be evaluated relative to
the performance of the other three participants of your group in the previous task
(Task 2-tournament). The Task 2-tournament is the one you just completed. If you
correctly identify more emotions than they did in Task 2, then you receive four times
the payment from the piece rate, which is $2 per correct answer. You will receive no
earnings for this task if you choose the tournament and do not correctly identify more
emotions now, than the others in your group did in the Task-2 tournament. You will
not be informed of how you did in the tournament until the end of the experiment.
If there are ties the winner will be randomly determined.
Please choose whether you want the piece rate or the tournament applied to your
performance. The images will begin on the screen once everyone makes their selection.
Please do not talk with one another. If you have any questions, please raise your
hand.
TASK 4 Submit Piece Rate
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You do not have to identify any emotions for the fourth task of the experiment.
Instead, your score from Task 1 - Piece Rate will be used according to your choice for
payment. You can either choose to be paid according to the piece rate, or according
to the tournament.
If the fourth task is the one selected for payment, then your earnings for this task
are determined as follows. If you choose the piece rate you receive 50 cents per correct
answer in Task 1.
If you choose the tournament your performance will be evaluated relative to the
performance of the other three participants of your group in the Task 1-piece rate.
If you correctly identified more emotions in Task 1 than they did then you receive
four times the earnings of the piece rate, which is equivalent to $2 per correct an-
swer. You will receive no earnings for this task if you choose the tournament and did
not correctly identify more emotions in Task 1 than the other members of your group.
Above, we remind you how many problems you correctly solved in Task 1. Please
choose whether you want the piece rate or the tournament applied to your perfor-
mance.
Please do not talk with one another. If you have any questions, please raise your
hand.
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A.2 Chapter 2 Appendix
A.2.1 Effect of being “badly wronged”
While the previous analysis has centered on the impact of the subjects’ feelings
towards their opponent on their tournament performance, the following analysis will
focus on the impact of being “badly wronged” on tournament performance in the
first period. I will define a subject as being badly wronged if he contributed at least
four more in the public goods game than his opponent. I chose this cutoff because it
represents the 90th percentile of differences between own and opponent public goods
game contributions. Essentially, those who are “badly wronged” consist of the 10%
of subjects who faired worst in the public goods game. This seems like a practical
and intuition threshold for categorizing subjects as “badly wronged.”
Table 6 presents t-tests as well as Fisher’s exact test of medians comparing per-
formance between subjects who were and were not badly wronged in the public goods
game. All p-values presented in Table 6 are two-sided unless otherwise specified.
Overall, there is a significantly difference in tournament performance between in-
dividuals who were and were not badly wronged as evident in the test of medians
(p=0.039). Male performance appears unaffected by being badly wronged as the
number of completed tasks rises by 1.03 (p=0.7676) on average and the median num-
ber of completed tasks rises by 2.00 (p=1.00). The effect of being badly wronged on
female tournament performance is marginally significant when looking at the test for
a difference in medians. Badly wronged females complete 4.59 more tasks on average
than not badly wronged females and the difference in medians is 5.00 (p=0.102). If
we look at the one-sided p-value instead because we are interested in an increase in
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performance, the difference in means is significant at the 10% level (p=0.085).1 There
is no difference in male and female tournament performance for those subjects who
were badly wronged, however there is a significant difference between male and fe-
male tournament performance for subjects who were not badly wronged. Males who
were badly wronged complete 0.90 more tasks than badly wronged females on average
(p=0.7941) while there is no difference in the median number of completed tasks for
badly wronged males and females. Males who were not badly wronged complete 4.46
more tasks than badly wronged females on average (p=0.0047) while the difference
in the median number of completed tasks for not badly wronged males and females
is 3.00 (p=0.010).
While the results using reported feelings and being badly wronged do not exactly
mirror each other, the signs of the statistics remain consistent and tell a consistent
story that the increase in female performance is driving the overall increase and the
gender gap in tournament performance is eliminated.
Table A.1: Difference in Means - Subject was badly wronged (contributed at least
4 more than assigned opponent)
Group 1 Group 1 Group 2 Group 2 Diff. in Means Diff. in Medians
Mean Perf. Mean Perf. (p-value) (p-value)
All Subjects 12.10 All Subjects 15.41 3.31 4.00**
(Not Badly Wronged) (Badly Wronged) (0.1814) (0.039)
Males 14.70 Males 15.73 1.03 2.00
(Not Badly Wronged) (Badly Wronged) (0.7676) (1.00)
Females 10.24 Females 14.83 4.59 5.00
(Not Badly Wronged) (Badly Wronged) (0.2049) (0.102)
Females 14.83 Males 15.73 0.90 0.00
(Badly Wronged) (Badly Wronged) (0.7941) (1.00)
Females 10.24 Males 14.70 4.46*** 3.00***
(Not Badly Wronged) (Not Badly Wronged) (0.0047) (0.010)
P-values in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
1There were only six females who were categorized as “badly wronged” and this small sample
size could be what is responsible for the large p-values.
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A.2.2 All Period Analysis
Between tournament rounds, subjects were informed whether or not they won
the previous round. While they were not informed about how many tasks their
opponent completed, informing subjects about the results prior to additional round
may influence behavior.
This difference in information processing appears to muddle the true effect of
the emotions on tournament performance, however, the general trends in male and
female performance are maintained. Table 7 shows that over all five periods, subjects
competing with an opponent who was rated as strongly negative complete 5.82 tasks
more than subjects who completed again a differently rated individual. This difference
is highly significant (p=0.0000). Consistent with the first period of data analysis,
females respond strongly to the emotion through a significant increase in performance
of 6.95 tasks (p=0.0000). While male and female performance differs significantly
when competing with an individual not viewed as strongly negative (p=0.0000), this
gender gap in tournament performance is almost entirely eliminated in the presence of
strongly negative emotions and is only significant at the 10% level. (p=0.0711). While
male performance appeared unaffected by the emotions in the period one analysis,
male performance appears to differ significantly at the 5% level when assessing all five
periods (p=0.0409). The last two results differ slightly from the period one analysis
and may be the result of the varying influences of relative performance feedback
for men and women. There may even be an interaction between emotions and the
processing of relative performance that are confounding the results using all five
periods of data. Positive feedback may spur men to compete hard for multiple periods
while positive feedback for women may be significantly more transitory. Women may
view a successful round as a “fluke”, while men will see it as a direct result of their
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efforts. However, the general results still hold using either analysis but it is easy to
see that an analysis with only the first period of data is much cleaner and without
potential confounds.
Table A.2: Difference in Means - All Periods
Group 1 Group 1 Group 2 Group 2 Difference in Means
Mean Perf. Mean Perf. (p-value)
All Subjects (Rating> 1) 23.90 All Subjects (Rating=1) 29.73 5.82***
(0.0000)
Males (Rating>1) 28.04 Males (Rating=1) 32.21 4.17*
(0.0409)
Females (Rating>1) 20.75 Females (Rating=1) 27.70 6.95**
(0.0000)
Females (Rating=1) 27.70 Males (Rating=1) 32.21 4.51
(0.0711)
Females (Rating>1) 20.75 Males (Rating>1) 28.04 7.29**
(0.0000)
P-values in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Table 8 presents the regression analyses using all five periods of data. As with the
previous analysis, all regressions included session dummy variables and demographic
variables. Additionally, I included period dummy variables to account for any learning
across periods. Standard errors were clustered on the session level.
The majority of the period one analysis results hold including the significant effect
of gender and opponents rated strongly negative on tournament performance. The
difference-in-differences estimates are no longer significant using all five periods of
data but this is very possibly due to the potential autocorrelation in the standard
errors due to the between round feedback. Because I am looking at the differing
responses to the emotion across genders, the fact that men and women process and
respond to feedback differently can significantly influence behavior and thus coefficient
values as well as standard errors and the resulting hypothesis tests.
Additionally, if the regressions in Table 8 are run including a dummy variable
equal to one if the individual won the previous tournament round and zero otherwise,
in all specifications, the other significant predictors of subject effort are public goods
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Table A.3: OLS Regression Results - All Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Completed Completed Completed Completed
Slider Tasks Slider Tasks Slider Tasks Slider Tasks
Subject Contribution 0.838* 0.735 0.652 0.640
(0.454) (0.459) (0.454) (0.456)
Male 6.732** 6.684** 6.646** 7.162**
(2.503) (2.570) (2.553) (2.762)
Negative Feeling Dummy 0.634
(2.283)
Positive Feeling Dummy 1.013
(1.663)
Strongly Negative 3.165 3.633* 4.732
(2.341) (1.826) (3.167)
Somewhat Negative -1.641
(2.372)
Somewhat Positive 0.532
(2.955)
Strongly Positive 1.705
(3.601)
Strongly Negative*Male -2.463
(4.285)
Constant 7.079** 6.969** 6.802** 6.686**
(2.918) (2.881) (2.722) (2.724)
R2 0.2949 0.3027 0.3002 0.3011
N 889 889 889 889
Session Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
*p<0.10, **p<0.05. P-values are two-sided. Standard errors in parentheses. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by session.
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game contribution, a dummy variable for whether the individual is a male, and the
“win” dummy variable. More specifically, positive feedback after the previous round
results in a significant increase in effort in the following round. These additional
regressions provide more concrete evidence that the role of the feedback is eliminates
the effect of the emotions and therefore the period one analysis is ideal for answering
the current research question.
A.2.3 Instructions and Screen Shots
Welcome
Thank you for choosing to participate in this experiment on decision-making. You
will be paid for your participation in cash, privately at the end of the experiment.
What you earn depends partly on your decisions and the decisions of the other partic-
ipants and partly on chance. Please turn off pagers, mp3 devices and cell phones now.
The entire experiment will take place through the computer and there will be no
interaction with participants seated at other computers. Please do not talk or in any
way try to communicate with other participants during the experiment. This exper-
iment consists of two stages. I first describe Stage 1 and Ill give you instructions for
Stage 2 once Stage 1 is over. I will review the instructions with you. Please follow
along on your screen and click the Next button when told. If at any point you have
a question, please do not hesitate to raise your hand, and I will be by to answer your
question. Please refrain from communicating with any of the other participants.
Stage 1 Instructions
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In the first stage you will be randomly placed in a group of four. In this stage
you will each be given $7. You must decide how much of your $7 to allocate to the
group account while keeping the rest for yourself. You can choose any whole number
between zero and seven, inclusive. After each group member has chosen an allocation,
the money in the group account will be multiplied by 1.6 and then distributed evenly
among group members.
Your payoff from the first stage is the sum of what you kept from your $7 and
your portion of the group account.
Your Payoff = $7 Your Contribution + 1.6*(Sum of all Contributions)/4
After the money is divided, each person’s allocation decision will be shown to all
group members listed by ID number (please note your ID number at the top of your
screen in blue). Here are a few examples to make sure you understand.
Example 1
One person contributes $7 and the other three contribute nothing.
In this scenario, the individual who contributed everything will receive $2.80.
$7-$7+1.6*(7)/4 = $11.20/4 = $2.80
The other three who contributed nothing will receive $9.80.
$7-$0+1.6*(7)/4 = $7+$11.20/4 = $9.80
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Example 2
Everyone contributes $7.
In this scenario, all individuals will receive $11.20.
$7-$7+1.6*(28)/4 = $44.80/4 = $11.20
Example 3
Two people contribute $7 and the other two contribute nothing.
In this scenario, the individuals who contributed everything will receive $5.60.
$7-$7+1.6*(14)/4 = $22.40/4 = $5.60
The other two who contributed nothing will receive $12.60.
$7-$0+1.6*(14)/4 = $7+$22.40/4 = $12.60
Example 4
Everyone contributes $0.
In this scenario, all individuals receive their initial $7.00 endowment.
$7-$0+1.6*(0)/4 = $7.00
Example 5
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One person contributes $2, one contributes $5, one contributes $0, and one con-
tributes $7.
In this scenario, the individual who contributed $2 will receive $10.60.
$7-$2+1.6*(14)/4 = $5+$22.40/4 = $10.60
The individual who contributed $5 will receive $7.60.
$7-$5+1.6*(14)/4 = $2+$22.40/4 = $7.60
The individual who contributed nothing will receive $12.60.
$7-$0+1.6*(14)/4 = $7+$22.40/4 = $12.60
The individual who contributed everything will receive $5.60.
$7-$7+1.6*(14)/4 = $22.40/4 = $5.60
You will now be asked to calculate the payoffs for two other potential scenarios in
order to check your understanding. Once you have completed the questions, please
wait for the other participants to finish as well. Once all participants have finished,
the first stage will begin.
Stage 2 Instructions
The second stage will consist of five 1.5-minute (90 seconds) rounds. In this
stage, 48 slider bars ranging from 0 to 100 will appear on your screen. Your task is
to successfully slide as many bars as you can to the half way mark (50) in the 1.5
minutes (90 seconds). If you complete all 48 slider bars before time is up, a screen
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with an additional 48 slider bars will appear for you to work on. You can use any
combination of the mouse and keyboard to complete the task. You will be paired
with an individual from your group in the first stage, and you will know the ID
number of the individual with whom you are now paired. You will be paired with
this individual for all five rounds. The screen will display the number of successfully
completed tasks as the period progresses. One of the five rounds will be selected
at random for payment. The winner (the individual who completes the most tasks
successfully among the pair) of the selected round will earn $2.50. In the case of a
tie, the winner will be selected at random.
Figure A.1: Public Goods Game Results and Emotion Elicitation
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Figure A.2: Slider Task Screenshot
Figure A.3: Cumulative Density Function of Slider Task Performance in Period 1
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Figure A.4: Cumulative Density Function of Public Goods Game Contributions -
All Subjects
Figure A.5: Cumulative Density Function of Public Goods Game Contributions - Females
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Figure A.6: Cumulative Density Function of Public Goods Game Contributions - Males
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